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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bootstrap Problem
The term "bootstrap sale" has come to mean a transaction in which
a business, in effect, purchases itself. The owner of the business "sells"
it at a highly favorable price, often millions of dollars, to a newly organ-
ized corporation which often has only a few thousand dollars in assets.
Since the purchase is not made out of independent funds by a financially
responsible purchaser, payment can only come out of the income and
assets of the business transferred. Indeed, the cash for the small down
payment is frequently pulled directly out of the business, immediately
before or after the transfer.
The owner receives capital gains treatment on the proceeds of this
"sale"-for what had previously been ordinary income. And yet he
continues to occupy much the same economic position after the transac-
tion as before, retaining substantial ownership rights and liabilities,
including control for a period of years and the risks of the business.
Because the new entity acquires the business with tax-free funds-via
*This is Part I of a two-part Article; Part II vill appear in a subsequent issue.
t Law School, Yale University. A.B. 1939, LL.B., 1942, Harvard University.
Formerly associated with the Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service.
The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not purport to represent the
U.S. Treasury.
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either a charitable exemption or a net operating loss carry-over -- it is
able to offer a higher price than an ordinary purchaser and to provide
greater assurance of ultimate payment.
The original bootstrap cases were based on the use of the charitable
exemption granted by section 101 (6) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939.2 After the 1939 Code provisions were tightened by the Revenue
Act of 1950,' tax planners cast bootstrap sales in the form of leases so
as to make use of various loopholes in the 1950 legislation.4 A still more
recent use of the bootstrap technique is seen in the transfer of profit
cemeteries to "nonprofit" cemetery companies. The latest and most
complicated bootstrap technique has been the combined employment of
bootstrap sales, net operating loss carryovers and affiliation in a con-
solidated return.5
It is the object of this Article, first, to study the sources, develop-
ment and probable future evolution of the bootstrap device; ' and second,
thereby to present a case history of what has been described as the
"erosion" of the progressive income tax.7  Because a great many tax
doctrines, many of them in conflict with supposed general theories of
progressive income taxation, have gone into the evolution of the boot-
strap mechanism, it affords a graphic illustration of the gap erosion has
created between the theory and actual practice of our tax process.
I The term "bootstrap sale" is sometimes applied to a simpler form of this trans-
action, such as the sale of a business to a purchaser without assets, or on terms calling
for payment only out of earnings. For convenience the term will be here applied to
the more complex transactions listed in the text accompanying notes 34-40 infra, all
of which make use of tax-free funds.
2 Ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3)).
3 Ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906.
4 See the detailed discussion of the shortcomings of this legislation in Comment,
Colleges, Charities and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851 (1951).
5 This device was successfully used by Botany Mills, Inc., a detailed description
of which appears in Murphy, Sonnabend's Sackful, Fortune, Sept. 1958, p. 133. See
also Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of
the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 885, 893-94 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Advisory Group Hear-
ings] (statement of George E. Lent); Lent, Net-Operating-Loss Carryovers and
Corporate Mergers, in 1959 Advisory Group Hearings 899.
6 Of the four general types of bootstrap cases, only one, the "original" boot-
strap, has as yet been litigated. The litigated cases include Caldwell v. Campbell,
218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955); Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 142
F. Supp. 899 (Ct. Cl. 1956) ; Estate of Howes, 30 T.C. 909 (1958), aff'd sub nora.
Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959); W. H. Truschel, 29 T.C.
433 (1957), order amended, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 110 (1957); Emanuel N. Kolkey,
27 T.C. 37 (1956), af'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958); Ohio Furnace Co., 25 T.C.
179 (1955) (gov't appeal withdrawm).
7An exhaustive study of tax erosion and its implications is beyond the scope
of this Article. The writer, in a recent presentation on tax reform to the House
Ways and Means Committee (Some Realities of Tax Reform, in 1 HousE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX REVISION COMPENDITJM-COM-
PENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAx BASE 19 (Comm. Print 1959) [here-
inafter cited as 1959 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM]) attempted a general outline of
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The Role of General Principles
It has been suggested that social reality is too complex for men to
grasp and that it is presumptuous and futile to attempt broad general
theories in the social sciences.8 Thus it is contended that no one man
can fully consider the innumerable factors affecting even the decision to
start a municipal slum clearance project, and that, a fortiori, the search
for effective general theories at the level of an entire nation is illusory.
It is urged that the decisions which structure society (the area of the
social sciences, in brief) are not arrived at on the basis of preconceived
general theory, but merely reflect a series of short range compromises
between competing, pluralistic interests.
It is true that in practice our present tax structure appears to reflect
many special decisions in favor of individual interests and groups. But
if the overall public interest is to prevail, then an important weapon is
an integrated general tax theory consistent with the basic goals of our
particular democracy. These goals, as a minimum, must emphasize a
democratic society based on human dignity in which there is the widest
possible sharing of such values as power, wealth, enlightenment, respect
and similar fundamental human preferences.'
We profess already to have such a general tax theory in our pro-
claimed doctrine of progressive income taxation: that income shall be
taxed, and at progressively increasing rates, to the taxpayer who earned
it.' Progressive taxation is justified not by abstract economic theories
of "ability to pay" or by the comparative "marginal utility" of having
some of the major factors behind tax erosion. The present Article seeks to offer a
case history in a specific area. Aspects of judicial, administrative or legislative
erosion that bear upon the bootstrap technique will be considered. However, the
major attention will be devoted to the judicial component, which has been particularly
important in the bootstrap area.
The term tax erosion is often used in several ways. It may mean the failure
of the income tax system to give effect in practice to the principle that income shall
be taxed, and at progressively increasing rates, to the person who earned it. Paul,
Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, 11 TAx L. REv. 203 (1956), and
Pechman, Erosion of the Individual Income Tax, 10 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1957), are
two of the writers who have emphasized the discrepancy between the steep statutory
tax rates and the way the taxing system actually operates in practice. See also authori-
ties cited note 14 infra.
"Erosion" may also refer to the deviation of the progressive tax from its supposed
objective of securing and broadening the democratic shape of our society. The term
is often used here in both of these senses for they are frequently synonomous. Where
they are not, then the preference basic to this paper will be for the use of the term in
the second sense. The distinction sets off two of the major approaches to tax reform.
It is discussed at some length in Some Realities of Tax Reform, .supra.
8 Lindblom, Policy Analysis, 48 Am. EcoN. REv. 298 (1958).
9 See Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
10 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1, 61(a). See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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one's top dollar taxed " but by its relevance to the goals of a liberal
democracy. The real merits of progressive taxation lie in its ability to
provide and maintain the essential conditions for such a democracy-the
avoidance of great extremes of wealth and poverty, the broader sharing
of all of a society's values and the prevention of a degree of concentration
of wealth and power fatal to democratic processes.
We claim that our present tax system reflects the principles of
progressive income taxation. But while the statutory rates climb
sharply upward to a high of ninety-one per cent, 12 the effective rates of
taxation are far lower,13 many taxpayers are paying at rates substan-
tially lower than the general public has come to anticipate, and many
forms of income are escaping taxation.
A number of contemporary commentators attribute this process
of tax "erosion" to an ever-growing network of "preferential provi-
sions" in the statutes.' 4 Frequently cited examples of such relief provi-
sions include the special treatment for capital gains, percentage deple-
tion, special executive compensation such as expense accounts and stock
options, fringe benefits generally, the income splitting privilege available
to married couples, the many exemptions and deductions for personal
expenditures not related to the cost of producing income, tax exempt
interest on local and state bonds, the dividend exclusion and credit, the
ability to accumulate income in a closely held corporation and so forth.
But the processes of tax erosion cannot be so simply described as
the label "preferential provisions" implies. The taxing process reflects
a basic political struggle as to the overall allocation of the tax burden-
IIBLUM & KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953),
discusses progressive taxation, listing many of the economic theories advanced in
support of progressive taxation and providing a detailed bibliography of the area.
12 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
13 Paul, supra note 7, Pechman, supra note 7.
14 Blum, The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer
Morale, in JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FEDERAL
TAx POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY-PAPERS SUBMITTED BY PANELISTS
APPEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TAX POLICY 251 (Joint Comm. Print
1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 COMPENDIUM] ; Cary, Pressure Groups and the
Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws,
68 HAgv. L. REv. 745 (1955); Groves, Special Tax Provisions and the Economy,
1955 COMPENDIUM 286; Hellmuth, Erosion of the Federal Corporate Income Tax,
1955 COMPENDIUM 888; Hess, The Gentle Art of Tax Avoidance, The Reporter,
April 16, 1959, p. 12; Lubar, A Plan for Tax Reform, Fortune, March 1959, p. 92;
Mills, Curtis, Ruttenberg, Heller, Rudick, Thomson, all in Mills & others, What Can.
We Do About Taxes, Fortune, July 1959, p. 90; Paul, supra note 7; Pechman, supra
note 7; Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58 COLUm. L. REv.
815 (1958); Thompson & Silberman, Can Anything Be Done About Corporate
Taxes?, Fortune, May 1959, p. 121; Hearings on the General Revision of the Internal
Revenue Code Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958). Many of the 170 papers contained in 1959 TAx REvIsIoN COMPENDIUM,
particularly those in the first volume, take this position.
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briefly, "Who Shall Bear What Burden of Which Taxes ?" As such,
the erosion of the progressive income tax can be analyzed only in terms
of all the processes, legislative, judicial and administrative, whereby tax
decisions are made.
II. SUBSTANCE OVER FORM AND TAx EROSION:
THE ROLE OF LEGAL MYTHS
The judicial process and its traditional ways of legal thought have
been one important factor in the growth of tax erosion upon the frame-
work of the bootstrap device. Several assumptions are basic to an
analysis of this development. The most fundamental lies in the prefer-
ences that have been indicated for a society based on human dignity in
which there is the widest possible production and sharing of basic
values-a society that is profoundly democratic. Closely tied to this
is the role of "Truth" or "rational inquiry" or "scientific method" or
"substance over form"--the label matters not. This problem of method
is intimately related to the achievement of a broader democracy and to
the role of progressive taxation in that achievement.
To tie many large truths in a very small bundle, there is, perhaps,
one distinctive feature which marks off democracy from other forms
of society.. That feature is the rejection of privilege in any form as
an organizing principle for society. And there is nothing that plays
a larger role in that rejection than Truth or rational inquiry or scientific
method.
One convenient way to illustrate this may be to consider the role
of social and legal concepts or myths.' 5 There is a tendency for the
legal mind to rely upon concepts or myths. The bootstrap litigations
and their many related judicial doctrines focus upon whether a particular
transaction can be fitted within a choice of labels-"sale" or "no sale,"
"notes" or "stock," "assignment" or "license," "sale" or "lease"-
rather than upon examining the substance of the relationships behind
such concepts. Much of the gulf between our claimed system of progres-
sive taxation and the actual pattern of decision can be described by, or
even attributed to, such an effort to force complex transactions into an
inappropriate legal concept.
15 The analysis that follows was the source for a similar discussion of the role
of legal myths in Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, mtpra note 7. However in
the congressional paper there was an effort to tie this analysis in with some of the
general problems of tax erosion, as compared to the more detailed study of a specific
legal problem essayed here. The earlier paper offers a general framework and per-
spective for the present study.
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To greatly oversimplify for purposes of this discussion: external
reality is always more complex than the words and ideas with which
men seek to understand, organize, and communicate their ideas about
reality. Even so simple a concept as "table," or "chair," leaps many
gulfs, bridges many unanswerable questions, and is only a rough, short-
hand approximation of the reality which it seeks to describe. This com-
plexity and ambiguity is multiplied many times over when we seek to
describe not merely the physical universe, but social, political and legal
relationships. Nevertheless, neither society nor rational action would
be possible without some form of generalization.
Each of us has a different general perspective or Weltanschaung
from which we view the universe, that is, organize reality. These per-
spectives will vary with the various predispositions of culture, class,
interest, and personality characteristic of the particular individual and
his environment, and with the stability of his particular society.' Thus
we all use general ideas, concepts, labels with which to understand, to
organize and communicate.
By the same token any organized society depends upon a high
degree of consent and a relatively limited use of power and force to
maintain its structure. And in every society there are individuals and
groups whose actual or conceived self-interest lies along lines which are
not mutually harmonious. To use a narrow example, the industrialist
usually has a quite different idea of the proper function of a taxing
system from that of a farmer, or a workingman.
In order to seek their own self-interest within the framework of an
organized society, most groups and individuals alike tend to rationalize
what they conceive to be their self-interest in terms of a broader com-
munity interest-so as to achieve the broadest possible range of accept-
ance. Thus the businessman will emphasize the public interest in
stimulating economic "incentives," while lower income groups may
stress the "equity" of high income or estate taxes. But when the tax
myths are said and done, they still turn upon "Who Shall Bear What
Burden of Which Taxes."
In a society operative at an ideal level of democracy there would
be little or no special privilege, and no group would find it necessary to
rationalize its own self-interest in terms of a claimed general interest.
That situation we are unlikely to see. But the more any society is
dominated by special interests, rather than by a broad-based emphasis
on the general public welfare, the greater the discrepancy between its
social, political and legal myths and the social reality they purport to
16 See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 9.
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describe.17  And by the same token, the more vulnerable are those
myths to Truth and rational inquiry. The Russians offer dramatic
illustration of this. They pose as a classless, popular democracy.
Behind this facade is a grim police state in which power and privilege
are held by a relatively few. The extent to which the communist myth
lacks reality is a corollary of the high degree of force they need to main-
tain their society-and of the accompanying high level of censorship
which conceals the fact that their society is run by the few in the interest
of the few.
Conversely, the more democratic a particular society is, the less
dominant will be its special interests, and the more its social, political
and legal myths can withstand rational scrutiny. Thus the test of legal
ideas must first be whether they accurately describe the underlying social
adjustments they are used to effectuate or whether they are merely
rationalizations for a different posture of affairs. This becomes a
primary question when one comes to examining the so-called prefer-
ential provisions in the tax law.
By legal myths or concepts is meant not only ideas with a particular
form or content, but also the way those ideas are employed within the
tax and other legal decision processes. Thus you may have a tax concept
such as "sale" or "reorganization" or "gift" or "dividend" which may
have, at least definitionally, some ascertainable factual content-either
now or when it originally developed. But if it is continually applied to
situations not really encompassed by its basic notion, or if it is not
applied to situations where it is appropriate, then its use becomes more
and more artificial or conceptual, and it may come to rationalize special
interests in a general context.
This may in part represent a process of economic evolution. The
''sale" concept initially comprised such a relatively simple transaction
as the purchase of a pig in a market. With such a limited relationship,
there was no great difficulty in determining if and when a "sale" had
occurred and criteria such as the "passage of title" were almost work-
able. But with the growing complexity of present day transactions, in
many of which a transferor may retain some indicia of ownership and
transfer others, as with the many transactions to be considered ranging
from the "sale and leaseback" to an oil and gas lease, the "sale" concept
may not be readily applicable. The very insistence on applying it may
be a form of conceptualism.
17 See ELLIOTT, THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS (1928); FR=rRIci, CON-
sTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1928); MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
(1936) ; PARSONS, THE STRucTuRE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1937).
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There also may be concepts which are inconsistent with the factual
criteria which they purport to embody. Such legal labels as "corporate
contraction" 18 or "capital asset" 19 illustrate this type of mythology.
Neither term has any discernible rational content and both serve almost
exclusively as rationalizations for special tax advantage. There are a
number of other types of legal myth to be considered as part of this
analysis. Thus a concept may be so ambiguous as to be readily subject
to manipulation-as witness the "property" concept. Almost anything
can be labeled "property." But that may not afford a very useful guide
for legal decision. Part of the stock option problem turns on the claim
that an option is "property." Then, if you deal in "property," ergo,
you get capital gains treatment. Yet once such mechanical solutions
are abandoned, the problem assumes a different hue.2°
18 The case of Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. BuLL. 2,
is a primary source of the doctrine that where there is a "contraction" of a part of a
corporation's business (in Imler there was a fire and the insurance money was not
reinvested), this is a "partial liquidation" Consequently, a distribution to the share-
holders is not taxed as a dividend, even though it represents a pro rata distribution
out of earnings and profits. Every dividend distribution includes some "contraction'
of the corporate assets. But there is no logical relationship between whether a
corporation "contracts," and whether its distributions of earnings are a dividend.
Cohen, Gelberg, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, Corporate Liquidations Under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 55 COLUM. L. Ray. 37, 52, n.61 (1955) : "There is
grave doubt . . . whether the concept of partial liquidation in general has any
sound basis." See ALI, FEDERAL INcOmE, ESTATE, & GIFT TAXATIoN-INcomE
TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1958) ; Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau
& Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate
Distributions to Shareholders, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 36-38 (1952).
19 See the discussion of "capital assets" in note 299 infra.
20 A stock option represents a type of continuing relationship between a corporation
and its shareholders or employees. The option holder is given the risk-free, interest-
free use of the corporate capital invested in the optioned property so that he may-
as dividend or compensation-take advantage of the possible future appreciation of
that property. The transaction is not really closed until the option is exercised. At
that point the option holder's receipt of the appreciated property represents a com-
pleted dividend or compensation. To say that the option is "property" and so to
treat its original distribution as a closed event ignores the facts. The whole trans-
action is centered on the continuing relationship, whereby the corporation continues
to hold the optioned item at its own risk while awaiting the option holder's decision.
It is a continuous, but contingent, flow of value between corporation and option holder.
To use a "property" approach is to emphasize the label for the transaction, rather
than its factual character.
A similar comment applies to the effort to gloss over the compensatory character
of an option by saying it was "intended" to provide an "incentive" to employees by
giving them a "proprietary" interest. The lower courts, perhaps influenced by the
fact that a bargain purchase between unrelated parties at arm's length is held not to
produce income, held that an employee realized no taxable income upon the exercise
of an option "intended" to give him a "proprietary" interest. Commission v. Straus,
208 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Robert A. Bowen, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 668 (1954) ;
Edward Eagan, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 876 (1953); Donald B. Bradner, 11 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 566, aff'd per curian, 209 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1953) ; James M. Lamond,
5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 51 (1946); Clarence L. Landen, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 411
(1943) ; Lyon, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1950, 51 COLUm.
L. REv. 1 (1951). This, unfortunately, ignores the actual relationships between the
parties. Similarly, a group of older cases emphasizes whether the bargain purchase
was "intended" to be compensation. Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 647 (9th
Cir. 1948); Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943); Ross-
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These brief remarks afford the framework for the most basic issue
posed herein-the importance of rational inquiry to the achievement
and maintenance of a broad democracy and to the progressive taxation
which by its ability to restrict special privilege can serve to further such
a system of society.
Such a technique of rational inquiry is known in the tax area as
the doctrine of substance over form. To many, the search for "sub-
stance" and for "form" has represented a deep enigma, for they have
assumed that these terms concealed some type of substantive answer to
the great legal questions. Thus, Judge Learned Hand, in the case of
Commissioner v. Sansome,21 called the doctrine that substance rather
than form should be followed "an anodyne for the pains of reasoning."
And Professor Ralph Rice suggests that cases like Gregory v. Helver-
ing,22 in relying on substance rather than form, are in fact being decided
primarily by epithets such as "artifice above reality" and virtually
signify the abandonment of a rational approach.1
3
But substance versus form is not a mere nebulous proposition as
to how far the literal language of the statute should be determinative
or how far certain vague concepts of the equities of the situation should
rule. Substance over form is not a doctrine of substantive law. It does
not contain explicit answers to legal questions. It is a method of
approach, a way of analyzing problems in the tax area and elsewhere.
Rather than legal conclusions, an approach centered on substance over
form embodies the insistence that in dealing with legal controversy a
basic inquiry shall be as to the relationship between the form of the
heim v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Dean Babbit, 23 T.C. 850 (1955) ;
Charles E. Sorenson, 22 T.C. 321 (1954); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953),
non acq., 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 8; Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
Wages are wages, and dividends are dividends, no matter how desirable the intention
with which they are distributed.
When the lower courts started to force the option relationship within such labels
as "proprietary option" or "property," it took the Supreme Court to cut through
the conceptual haze. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner
v. Smith, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). The Court applied the doctrine of substance over
form in rejecting the "proprietary" option as a concept without meaning, and in
holding that 'an option holder generally is taxed on the spread between the cost of
an option and its value at the time of exercise. This last holding is inconsistent with
a view that an option is "property." It recognizes an option as a continuing relation-
ship closed only at the time of exercise. But LoBue came too late, and Smith was
not given adequate effect by the lower courts. (See the cases cited in note 299,
infra). The use of stock options to convert compensation or dividends into capital
gains had become well enough established so that Congress felt no hesitancy to
codify this particular preferential provision. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A, added
by ch. 994, § 218(a), 64 Stat. 942 (1950), as amended (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 421). See Lyon, supra.
2160 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1932).
22293 U.S. 465 (1935).
23 Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combatting Tax Avoidance, 51 MIcH. L. REv.
1021 (1953).
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transaction, that is, the way in which it is done, and its factual con-
sequences.
24
Part of this inquiry must be into the appropriateness of applying
particular legal myths to the controversy at issue. Is the concept used
descriptive of what has occurred or is there a wide gulf between myth
and reality-between the proclaimed principles of progressive taxation
and the effective operation of the taxing process? It is at this point that
the effectiveness, and the non-neutrality of substance over form becomes
apparent. If a rationalization is just a rationalization it will not stand
up under a piercing rational scrutiny. If, for example, a "corporate
contraction" does not represent a real situation, the question becomes
whom does it serve and how? Is it a mere formalism whereby corporate
dividends are transmuted into capital gain?
There is another way in which a failure to apply a rational ap-
proach contributes to tax loopholes 25 and so to undemocratic patterns
of privilege. That way lies in the impact of deviations from basic
principle. If decisions in every part of the taxing process, judicial,
administrative and legislative, adhere to the principle that income shall
be taxed and at progressive rates to the person who earns it, there is
little room for the type of tax planning that produces loopholes and so
erosion. But frequently a court, an administrator or a legislator will
indulge in a departure from principle--one that at the time may appear
minor and innocuous. Yet it is the very fact of deviation from basic
doctrine that often creates the loophole. A number of such situations
are considered in this study: the early development of the "feeder"
doctrine " proceeded from what, at the moment, must have seemed like
a relatively trivial inconsistency in the application of a Supreme Court
dictum; the unimportant seeming formalism of the "make, use, sell"
formula for the patent area had ever spreading ramifications; ' the
doubtful logic of the "independent trustee" doctrine in the sale and lease-
back area 2 ' has contributed to a spreading erosion; the aberrations of
24 E.g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Commissioner
v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1940); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935) ; United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
25 The term "loophole" is sometimes used in the narrow sense of an inadvertent
oversight in the drafting of legislation. It frequently means a taxing provision of
which the speaker disapproves. "Loophole" is here used to mean a taxing prescription,
anywhere in the tax-decision process, which has the effect of giving a special ad-
vantage to any individual or group in a way that tends to produce a narrow, or
narrower sharing of any important value. And "erosion" describes a process, of which
loopholes are a symptom. See note 7 supra.
26 Discussed at notes 225-35 infra and accompanying text.
27 Discussed at notes 112-21 infra and accompanying text.
28Discussed at notes 209-12 infra and accompanying text.
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the "bunching" doctrine in the capital gains area 2 9 built upon the
foundation of what was initially a more limited inconsistency; the grow-
ing application of the "sale" concept to oil and gas transactions in which
a substantial ownership interest was retained 30 developed from other,
and more subtle inconsistencies; and so forth. In each case the pattern
has been similar. A doctrine is uttered or applied in a way which by
thorough-going application of substance-over-form principles would be
seen to be inconsistent, and upon this inconsistency resourceful tax
planners have been able to build.
This is not to suggest that form is necessarily meaningless or that
differences of form may not have substantive consequences.31 Form is
one of the important variables to be considered. But the approach called
substance over form recognizes that form is only one of the variables,
and that tax problems should be resolved upon all the variables and
within the framework of our proclaimed principles of progressive
income taxation. 2
29 Discussed at notes 304-13 infra and accompanying text
a0 Discussed at notes 96-98, 102-06 infra and accompanying text.
31 See BiTTxER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHaOLDERS
15 (1959).
32 This discussion of substance and form has necessarily been abbreviated. Other
aspects of the issues which it raises can be but briefly noted here and in note 33 infra.
As a broad generalization, form on the one hand, and substance on the other, meet
and serve two basic human desires. These are the desire for certainty and the desire
for justice. Insistence on form provides a type of certainty that is helpful and useful
to the conduct of business affairs. There are many areas of law where Holmes was
perhaps correct, that it is better to have any rule, as long as we know what the
rule is.
However, it is one thing to give weight to these considerations and another to
rely upon form alone. The objection to determining the tax treatment of trans-
actions solely by form is that too often it produces inequity. Thus, the decision in
Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
918 (1954), by its exclusive reliance on form, may have brought certainty to the tax
planner who now knew that he could distribute dividends at capital gains rates by
the use of a "preferred stock bailout" (preferred shareholder "sells" to a third
party, the corporation "redeeming" from the third party as part of the arrangement).
But it was hardly fair to the great majority of ordinary stockholders who pay tax
at ordinary rates on their dividends.
Indeed, there is grave doubt that the advantages and virtues of certainty, even
if they are in fact achieved by formalism, are more important than the feeling that
justice has been done. To make formal rules carrying eternal certainty was a major
goal of the feudal scholasticism which was the intellectual predecessor of common-law
formalism. Certainly a formal concept of contributory negligence-or the fellow
servant rule-made the result of many tort cases very certain, but it was often
e.x-tremely unfair to the injured plaintiff.
Furthermore, those who argue for form over substance because of the many
advantages of "certainty" often overlook the fact that a formal approach to tax
problems may bring only an artificial and unreal certainty. Many of the formal
concepts considered in this analysis have seemed to promise a true "certainty":
mathematical ratios of "debt" and "equity" indicate when there is "thin capitalization";
passage of title is a "sale"; an "assignment" but not a "license" receives capital
gains treatment. But as will be shown, such certainty has often been illusory and
fleeting at best, and particularly so where the certainty of such a formal concept
concealed a distribution of the tax burden at odds with prevailing or proclaimed
notions of justice.
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In summary, it is because so many legal myths are a rationaliza-
tion for particular interests, guised in the verbal claim to a broad com-
munity interest, that substance over form is so important a weapon for
progressive taxation. As the detail of this study will emphasize, formal-
istic ways of legal analysis leave intact those legal myths that rationalize
a structure of special advantage. Do we proclaim that every person
shall be taxed on income earned and at the same progressive rates, and
do we then indulge special preferences, shifting the tax burden in quite a
different way behind a facade of legal myths? If so, the conflicting
roles of formalism and of substance over form, and their relationship
to tax erosion become more apparent. It is the detailed operation of
this conflict that is the main thrust of this paper.3
III. THE FOUR MAJOR FORMS OF THE BOOTSTRAP DEVICE
All of the bootstrap arrangements which we will consider pose a
question of double import. First, is the transfer of ownership such as to
receive tax recognition for several purposes including capital gains
treatment? Second, do they make a permissible use of a source of
tax-free funds? These two problems in turn depend on a complex com-
bination of principles and analogies from several independent and major
tax areas. For example, the capital gains issue turns not only upon the
decisions and policies that lie behind capital gains treatment, but upon
a general analysis of the transfer of ownership. This, in turn, depends
upon the effect of a combination of principles, particularly the retention
of risk and control, the relationship of the transaction to the accom-
33 Just as there is an ebb and a flow in the tendency of the courts to interpret
laws strictly in favor of the Government or more leniently in favor of the individual,
so the application of substance over form can be seen concurrently to wax and to
wane. Thus most of the significant substance-over-form decisions appear in the late
thirties and the early forties (see, e.g., the cases cited at note 24 supra), while the
current tendency is to emphasize matters of form-perhaps as a product of the
current inclination towards conservatism and conformity. Certainly the Commissioner
has had his arguments on substance rejected by many courts in the past few years
in favor of an insistence on form and on the prerogative to minimize taxes. Casale
v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v.
Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Commissioner v. Gross, 236 F.2d 612
(2d Cir. 1956); McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954); Cham-
berlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953); C. F. Mueller Co. v. Com-
missioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951) ; McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947); John Wanamaker (Philadelphia)
v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1943).
The doctrines most commonly used to stave off an analysis based on substance
include the proposition that every taxpayer has a "right to minimize his taxes by
every legal means," and corollary to that, that "avoidance" but not "evasion" is
permissible. Similarly, the courts which wish to rely on form frequently inquire
whether the taxpayer has a "dominant or principal purpose to avoid taxes." Or the
argument may be advanced that the form of a transaction, or the amount of tax
minimization involved, is permissible as long as there is no "sham" or "lack of bona
fides" present. The practical functioning of such doctrines to defeat substance over
form and so to further tax erosion is a key part of the present analysis.
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panying use of a charitable exemption or loss carryover, and the ap-
plication of the basic doctrine of substance over form. And the effect
of the retention of risk, or of retention of control, in turn is illustrated by
major doctrines within each of those areas such as the economic interest
doctrine (retention of risk) or sale and leasebacks (retention of
control).
But to trace these doctrines and analogies back through the several
areas is to discover that not only do the "original" bootstrap decisions
deviate from certain basic tax principles, but that those very principles
have been subjected to a similar process of erosion, which contributed
significantly to the bootstrap results. For example, the original boot-
strap decisions fail to follow the supposedly basic doctrine that capital
gains treatment is not extended to the recurrent receipt of ordinary
business income. But when the relevant areas are examined it is seen
that such proclaimed doctrines themselves have been substantially
eroded.
The Original Bootstraps
Owner owns a going business whose transfer Owner negotiates
with Charity, an organization exempt under section 101 (6) of the 1939
Code.3" Charity, usually an independent and reputable public charity,
is to acquire the business at little or no cost and with no personal
liability for any business risks. 5 Charity does not wish to be asso-
ciated in the public mind with the operation of the competitive business
acquired. Such an operation may also on occasion be prohibited by the
terms of the Charity's charter. The solution is to employ Feeder, an
intermediary corporation, "usually organized either by Owner or by a
group of friends of Charity. Feeder's charter ordinarily provides that
its funds go only to Charity or to "charitable purposes," in the expecta-
tion that the business income will be held exempt under section 101 (6).
The actual "purchase" is made by Feeder who may contract to
acquire a business for a price as high as twenty or thirty million dollars,
while having as assets equity capital of only a thousand dollars. Not
only does Feeder lack substantial assets, but Charity does not assume
liability for any of the obligations due to Owner. Feeder purchases the
stock of the corporation which ran the old business with a down pay-
34 Ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended (now 1954 CODE, § 501(c) (3)).
35 In Ass'N OF AMERICAN UNIvERsITIEs, REPORT OF THE COmmrr=TEE ON FINAN-
CIAL SUPPORT AND TAXATION 3 (1950), it is stated "Few boards of trustees of a
university would be willing to accept the liability which would be involved in such
business enterprises were they to be owned directly by the university, rather than
by a separate corporation or foundation." Accord, Statement of Stuart Hedden,
Trustee of Wesleyan College, Hearings on H.R. 8920 Before the Senate Committee
on Finance, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 567 (1950). See Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 851 (1951).
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ment which is an unsubstantial percentage of the total price, often being
under ten per cent. The purchase price is usually considerably in excess
of fair market value, although valuation problems often make that
difficult to prove. Even if valuation is based on a price-earnings ratio
as of the time of the transaction, it is difficult to prove in the case of a
closely held business.
Owner receives "notes" (or "bonds") payable over a ten to
twenty-year period for the balance of the "purchase" price. The notes
do not provide expressly that they shall be paid only from income if,
as and when earned, but ordinarily no other source of payment is avail-
able. Frequently, almost all of the income from the business goes to
Owner in the form of payments on the notes with little or nothing being
paid immediately to Charity, although Charity through its ownership
of Feeder will accumulate a substantial equity via the payments on the
notes, if the price does not prove too large. The payments on the notes
are directly related to the fortunes of the business, and in cases where
the business does better than expected it may prove possible to pay off
the notes." But where the risks of the business prove excessive, the
transaction may collapse with little or no principal payment on the
notes.
3 7
Usually Owner retains some control with respect to the operation
of the business. The control may be limited to a contractual permission
to continue management of the business or may extend to fairly exten-
sive control of Feeder. And Owner may recapture the business if its
profits do not prove sufficient to make the agreed payments.
This is a very pleasant arrangement for Owner and Charity.
Charity puts in no money and takes no risk, yet it gets from the start
such portion of the business' income as is left over after Owner receives
his annual payments on the notes and, when the notes are eventually
paid, Charity, who holds Feeder's stock, will own the business. Owner
usually receives a higher price than an ordinary business purchaser
would pay, has this inflated obligation repaid out of tax-free income
without having fundamentally changed his economic relationship to the
business, and reports the payments as capital gains rather than ordinary
income. Is this then that rarest of all transactions, a deal in which
everyone gains and no one has to pay the fiddler?
Charity apparently contributes nothing, not even the use of its
name. Why then is Owner willing to make such a deal? Why use
Charity at all? The answer clearly is not that Owner is making a gift
36 E.g., Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 899 (Ct.
Cl. 1956).
3 7 E.g., Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), af'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
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to Charity. The careful planning of these deals and this analysis of
their actual consequences makes it quite apparent that they involve a
deliberately planned quid pro quo. What is this quid pro quo that
Charity contributes?
In effect Charity is selling a portion of its tax exemption. That
is particularly apparent where an excessive price can be proved to the
court. Of course, the income available to pay the notes is much larger
if it is tax-free, and the high price was set because it was anticipated
that Feeder would be held exempt by virtue of nominally paying its
income over to Charity. Even where an excessive price cannot be
proved, there is the very substantial advantage of more secure and more
rapid payment of the notes out of tax-free income. During the whole
period of the pay-off to Owner, funds which were given tax exemption
so that they could be used for charitable and public purposes are going
directly into Owner's pocket. And the tax advantages of having made
a "sale" are granted on the assumption that there has been a substantial
present change in Owner's economic relationship to the business. But
Owner continues to run the business and to receive its profits much as
he always did. In brief, it can only be the public who ultimately pays
for the pleasant arrangement between Charity and Owner.
The "Lease" Bootstraps
The amendments to the 1939 Code contained in the Revenue Act
of 1950 made it more difficult to use the "feeders" basic to the original
bootstrap device. Furthermore, some charities already had subsidiary
feeder corporations with substantial business assets and did not wish
to expose these assets to the risks of the newly acquired business.
In order to meet these problems, Owner "sells" the business to
Feeder through use of the lease type of bootstrap. Charity owns
Feeder's voting stock. Since Feeder does not desire to issue notes on
which it would be liable, the contract must make explicit the same lack
of an independent purchase commitment that is achieved by the transfer
to an assetless purchaser in the original bootstrap cases. Therefore,
Feeder assumes no personal obligation to pay the price. Instead the
sale contract in the lease bootstrap provides that Owner shall receive
x percentage of the net profits of the business (usually as high as eighty
or ninety per cent) until the price is met.
To avoid other portions of the 1950 legislation Feeder does not
operate the business directly. Instead, after acquiring the business,
Feeder immediately leases it for five years or less to New Company,
another corporation, New Company often being directly or indirectly
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controlled by the original owner. As "rental" under that lease, Feeder
usually receives eighty or ninety per cent of the net profits from which
Feeder pays over the stipulated percentage to Owner. The effect of this
is to split off the operations of the business, which New Company
handles, from its income, which Feeder retains in the form of "rent"
from the lease.
These transactions, if accepted at their face value, have the same
substantial advantages for their participants as the original bootstraps:
retained ownership, capital gains treatment for the income from the
business, an inflated price, and the security and advantage of the use
of tax exemption. Their form-the short-term rental-is tailored to
take advantage of certain loopholes in the 1950 Revenue Act. 8
The "'Cemetery" Bootstraps
The simplest, and perhaps crudest, form of the bootstrap techniques
considered here is that employed in the transfer of a profit cemetery to
a nonprofit cemetery. Here no feeder or intermediate corporation is
employed. Owners of profit cemeteries organize new nonprofit ceme-
tery companies. Despite a lack of capital or assets, these new companies
"purchase" the stock of the old profit business from Owners at prices
ranging from several hundred thousand dollars to several million dol-
lars, and often in excess of fair market value. Long term "notes"
payable out of income from the cemetery operations are issued in pay-
ment to Owners. Owners retain full control over operation of the
cemetery through control of the board of directors of the new cor-
poration, or otherwise.
The new cemetery companies frequently operate a number of profit
operations, such as mortuaries, the sale of crypts or flower sales. Since
the provisions of the "unrelated business income tax" ' do not apply
to them, they can engage in a range of such commercial activities,
limited only by the outer extreme at which the courts will hold that
their activities are predominantly commercial rather than nonprofit.
Sometimes the old Owners also personally operate commercial activities
-a mortuary, for example, or an insurance business (covering burial
expenses)-in very close relationship to the cemetery. They may
employ the same bookkeepers and salesmen and even engage in joint
advertising. Thus the "nonprofit" cemetery often is the center of an
elaborate commercial operation, diverting profits to the original owners
in the ways peculiar to the bootstrap technique.
38 See notes 272-81 infra and accompanying text.
39 Discussed at notes 254-59 infra and accompanying text.
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The "Loss" Bootstraps
The loss bootstrap differs from the earlier forms.4 Its source of
tax-free funds is net operating losses. While it uses a thinly capitalized,
newly formed corporation to acquire the old (profit) business, it applies
the losses to the acquired business not through a feeder, or a rental
arrangement, but by affiliating the profit business with a consolidated
group of loss companies who apply their losses and loss carry-overs
against its profits. But the "bootstrap" features are the same as with
the earlier cases. That is, the old Owners keep substantial control over
the profit business and, having no independent source of payment,
retain the essential risks of the business.
IV. THE ORIGINAL BOOTSTRAP DECISIONS
Technically there were only two questions before the courts in
these bootstrap cases: (1) Are the original owners of the business en-
titled to capital gains treatment upon its "sale" ? (2) Is Feeder entitled
to exemption from tax under section 101 (6) of the 1939 Code? These
issues are interrelated. They involve a complex combination of other
legal questions, the most difficult of which is central to both: should the
transfer be treated as a "sale" for tax purposes?
The traditional common-law approach is to insist that there is a
legal label available for every transaction. If one takes this view, then
a bootstrap transfer either is a "sale" or else "no sale" has occurred and
the transaction will be disregarded. This approach has several dis-
advantages. If you say there has been a "sale" you are confronted by
the fact that Owner has retained so much of the ownership of the busi-
ness-both its control and its risks-that he has in substance kept much
the same economic relationship to the business that he had before the
transaction. On the other hand, if you conclude that it is "not a sale,"
you are confronted by the fact that legal title has been transferred and
that Owner will eventually yield all his interest in the business.
The transaction, indeed, is not a "sham," but neither is it the
traditional sale which the formal documents and the bare passage of
title might indicate. There has been a genuine transfer of the business
operations to Feeder. This will ordinarily be true even where the price
is inflated, for an excessive price does not necessarily show that no
transaction occurred, but rather that Owner has assured himself reten-
tion of the profits of the business for a considerable period.
4 o This form of the bootstrap will be considered in detail in Part II to be published
in a forthcoming issue.
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Caldwell and Kolkey
The first bootstrap case to be litigated, D.K. Caldwell v. Camp-
bell,4" involved an income asset (oil and gas interests) other than an
active business and consequently does not follow at all points the gen-
eral format sketched above. Owner sold some oil and gas interests
("carved out" oil payments) for more than $1,000,000 to his controlled
foundation, Feeder, which had total assets of $14,000. The downpay-
ment was $3,400 and the balance was given in notes to be paid over a
ten-year period. The issue was whether this sale to a penniless, con-
trolled charitable foundation was entitled to capital gains treatment.
The district court held that this "sale" was not a "bona fide" transac-
tion. At the same time the court also, and inconsistently, (if the sale
is to be disregarded as "sham") held Owner taxable on the market
value of the notes at the time of their receipt. The majority decision in
the Fifth Circuit cited the Commissioner's brief: "'Obviously here is
a case of a taxpayer trying to use, the exempt status of a charitable
foundation which he controlled, the capital gains and the installment
sale provisions of the revenue laws for his personal profit.' " 42 But
the court held that this argument had no merit, approved the transaction
as not a sham, and granted capital gains installment sale treatment.
The Commissioner's basic test case in the area, and the only deci-
sion he has won, is Emanuel N. Kolkey 3 Here a reducing pill busi-
ness was "sold" for $4,000,000 to Feeder, a new corporation with assets
of only $1,000. Of this price, $400,000 was a downpayment obtained
by drawing cash from the old business and pledging its assets. The
balance of the price was represented by notes to be paid over a period
of years. The old Owners kept full control and management of the
business. Charity received a total of only about $43,000 from the entire
transaction. The income of the business declined sharply, and after
about a year Charity sold its stock in Feeder back to Owners for $5,000.
Owners then purported to turn the stock over to a nonexistent charitable
trust, and later did turn it over to a trust with nominal activities, the
trust being controlled by Owners. Meanwhile, Feeder paid a number
of personal expenses for Owners. Within two years, two of the Owners
purchased the notes held by the third for less than two cents on the
dollar. Judge Pierce of the Tax Court found that the fair market value
of the old business was only about $1,100,000 and that the notes were
really equity capital-treating the transfer to so thinly capitalized a
41218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955).
42 Id. at 570.
4327 T.C. 37 (1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
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corporation ($1,000 in stock, $3,600,000 in notes) as being the equiv-
alent of a sale for $4,000,000 to a "penniless individual." 4 He em-
phasized substance over form, the lack of new capital or new manage-
ment, the retention of control and risk, the absence of effort to enforce
the notes on default, and the inflated price, and treated the $400,000
down payment as a dividend to Owners, rejecting the capital gains argu-
ment. On the exemption side he emphasized Feeder's commercial
activities, the fact that Owners had an equity rather than a creditor
relationship to Feeder, and that Feeder's dominant purpose was to inure
most of the income of the business to Owners.
Kolkey does have some elements of non-bona fides not found in
the other cases. These include, in addition to the court's finding of
excessive price, the doubtful nature of the particular reducing pill busi-
ness involved, the sham character of the trusts set up after the original
transaction collapsed, and some of the direct acts of private inurement
committed after the original, and reputable, charity had exited. Never-
theless, Kolkey was not a "sham," at least prior to the recapture of the
business, and the Tax Court opinion does not so treat it. Judge Pierce's
decision represents the only judicial effort 4 to date to examine what, it
is suggested, are the realities of these transactions. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed in a brief opinion 46 stressing retention of ownership and in-
come, but also questioning the arm's-length character of the trans-
action.
4 7
The Issues in the Other Cases
With the exception of Caldwell, the factual pattern of the original
bootstrap cases is that described at the outset of this Article.4 Indeed,
the Kolkey transfer was copied from the plan used in Knapp Bros.,
49
4427 T.C. at 60.
4 5 Excepting Judge Pierce's dissent, joined by several other judges, in Ohio
Furnace Co., 25 T.C. 179 (1955) (gov't appeal withdrawn).
46254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
47 Kolkey also raises a more subtle issue. It held the downpayment taken out
of the old business to be a dividend. This is essentially sound. However, Owner is
not literally a "shareholder," nor are the periodic payments literally "dividends,"
particularly in the lease-type bootstraps which lack "notes" to be called "stock."
The distributions are more accurately described as ordinary income under INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 61(a). They represent Owner's beneficial share in the profits of the
business. And even if a new corporation, with no earnings and profits, is included
in the transaction in such a way as not to inherit the earnings and profits of the old
business, the payments are no more capital gains "distributions" under § 301(c) than
they are "sales" under § 1222.
48 See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
49 Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 899 (Ct. Cl.
1956).
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Howes' Estate5" and TPruschel.51  Ohio Furnace added only the
minor variant of a new corporation to operate the business, with its
stock held by Feeder. These cases can be grouped to illustrate the
principal issues which arise.
The Determination of Fair Market Value
The only bootstrap case in which a court made the finding that the
purchase price was in excess of fair market value was Kolkey. There
the business income declined sharply and Owners recaptured the notes
without being paid (other than the downpayment). In Knapp Bros.,
on the other hand, a shoe business was sold for a price that at the time
of the transaction appeared by normal valuation standards to be inflated,
according to the Government's expert witnesses. But there was a boom
in the shoe business, and the price was paid off years ahead of the date
the notes were due. The Court of Claims emphasized these events,
which had occurred after the transaction, in making its finding of fair
market value a central element of its holding that the Knapp Feeder was
exempt.
In Howes' Estate (and Truschel), the income of the leather busi-
ness involved declined after the transaction, some of the "bonds" being
sold on the market a few years later at only 30 per cent of their face
value. But the hindsight which had enabled the Court of Claims to
find for the taxpayer in Knapp was strangely lacking in Howes' Estate.
This was abetted by the refusal of the top experts in the leather industry
to testify for the Government as to fair market value, compelling resort
to industry witnesses who were less qualified, and who were quickly
shaken on the stand by the court's hostile questioning.
In Ohio Furnace, Judge Pierce's dissent made it clear, not only
that there was no factual basis for the majority's finding of fair market
value, but that the Government had apparently not investigated nor
presented the facts as to value, no balance sheets, earnings statements,
or appraisals being offered in evidence.
The decisions in Howes' Estate and Truschel, which came after
Kolkey, distinguish it as a "sham," emphasizing the court's finding of
an excessive price. But those decisions, as well as Ohio Furnace, are
on shaky ground where fair market value is concerned. This inference
is supported by the testimony of Government expert witnesses in each
50 Estate of Howes, 30 T.C. 909 (1958), aff'd sub nora. Commissioner v. Johnson,
267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959).
51W. H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433 (1957), order amended, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
110 (1957).
52 Ohio Furnace Co., 25 T.C. 179 (1955) (gov't appeal withdrawn).
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litigated bootstrap case (other than Ohio Furnace) based on an ap-
praisal of the price-earnings ratio at the time of the transaction. Per-
haps more significantly, it is supported by the fact that the price was not
determined by normal bargaining in any bootstrap case, inasmuch as
Charity, which paid nothing and took no risks, lacked bargaining
power. The effort to distinguish Kolkey from the other bootstrap deci-
sions on the grounds of its excessive price would appear therefore to
lack an adequate factual basis.
The Retention of Risk
In every case the old business was purchased by a Feeder with no
substantial assets of its own, who issued "notes" or "bonds" in face
amounts many thousand times its meagre capital. The "thin capital-
ization" doctrine 5 3 has been applied in many cases where the ratios
were far less than 100 to 1.1" But the bootstrap decisions used the highly
formal argument that Owners were not literally "stockholders" to reject
application of the doctrine. They refused to treat the "notes" as
"stock," even though, in fact, Owners had retained a degree of owner-
ship higher than that normally held by stockholders, and they ignored
the fact that Kolkey had extended the thin capitalization doctrine to
similar "creditors" in a similar situation.
The Retention of Control
In each of the original bootstraps except Ohio Furnace, owners
continued to control and manage the business much as they had always
done; and in the latter, though less active, they retained substantial
control.55 Control was strengthened in each case by similar provisions
providing for recapture of the business in the event of default. No court
(except Kolkey) attached much weight to this.
Distributions to Charity and Other Exemption Issues
In Knapp Bros. and Ohio Furnace, no distributions were made to
Charity during the years in question. In Howes' Estate and Truschel,
53 See text accompanying notes 122-62 infra.
54 Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH IN ST. ON
Fun. TAX 771 (1959), contains a detailed briefing of the arithmetic ratios found in
many cases.
55 The former Owners in Ohio Furnace had the power, until payment was com-
pleted, to name % of the members of the board of directors. More significantly, the
company officers and the active manager were to be persons acceptable to Owners.
This must be read in light of the fact that the contract originally provided for Owners
to remain active managers of the business, but was modified in an apparent effort
to gain the approval of the Internal Revenue Service. Two of the Owners were
officers of the business, though at no compensation. The Owners also were officers
of the A Furnace Company, a manufacturing firm which was the source of supply
for the business. (The business held a franchise from A for the distribution of its
furnaces in Ohio.)
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the basic bootstrap transfer occurred in 1947. Annual distributions of
about 10 per cent of the income of the business were made to Charity
from 1947 to 1951, no payments being made between 1951 and the
dates of decision in the two cases (1958 and 1957). Yet, the bootstrap
cases (other than Kolkey) ignored the inurement in fact of the business
income to Owners,56 holding that Owners were receiving mere "pur-
chase price payments" as the by-product of a "sale." The "unreasonable
accumulation" " which resulted from the fact that the income from the
business went not to the charitable purposes whose existence supposedly
justified tax exemption, but was "accumulated" in the form of Charity's
increasing "equity," was similarly ignored. The court in Ohio Furnace
stated: "We know of no case . . . denied exempt status merely be-
cause it accumulated its income for distribution in a succeeding or later
year. . , 58
Section 302(d) of the 1950 Revenue Act
Knapp Bros., Howes' Estate and Ohio Furnace all rely upon Sec-
tion 302(d) of the Revenue Act of 1950, in upholding a charitable ex-
emption for Feeder. Subsection (d) was added to section 302 by the
Revenue Act of 1951 5' so as to insulate certain organizations from the
provisions of Section 301 (b) eliminating the exemption for charitable
"feeders" which the courts had created by the so-called "destination
test."
However, since section 302 (d) requires all of the feeder's earnings
to inure to a specified type of organization, and as Charity in Knapp
Bros. and Ohio Furnace got no distributions from Feeder during the
years in question, and in Howes' Estate (and Truschel) received only
a small percentage of the income, and that only in some years, this hold-
ing is not easy to rationalize. This is especially so in view of the legis-
lative history of section 302(d), which reveals a purpose to protect
organizations which had received funds from a feeder and spent them
in reliance on the feeder's being held exempt under the judicial "destina-
tion test." '0 This could not have occurred in Knapp or Ohio Furnace,
where nothing had been received. Nor is there anything to indicate
56 See text accompanying notes 240-47 infra.
57 See text accompanying notes 260-71 infra.
5825 T.C. at 190.
59 Ch. 521, § 601, 65 Stat. 562.
60 H.R_ CorF. REP. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1950), states this intention.
Section 601 of the 1951 Revenue Act was passed to carry it out by adding § 302(d),
according to H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1951) ; S. REP. No. 781,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1951).
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that section 302(d) was intended to eliminate the requirement that
there be no "private inurement" of exempted funds.6'
Use of the "Sale" or "No Sale" Approach
All of the bootstrap cases except Kolkey frame the issue as "sale"
or "no sale." This can give a realistic answer only in the rare situation
(such as Caldwell) where there is so much evidence of bad faith, and
so little evidence of any real transfer, that the transaction really is a
"sham." In any other situation, to state the question as "sale" or "no
sale" prevents analysis of the substance of the transaction, and pre-
judges it along conceptual lines. Thus, the degree of tax erosion which
these cases represent has a significant correlation with their emphasis
upon formalistic approaches.
If the statutory standard for capital gains taxation, i.e., a "sale or
exchange" 62 is to be taken seriously, then it must be read to require
a commercially meaningful transfer of ownership. It is difficult to say
that such a transfer has occurred if the original owners, by keeping
control of the business and ability to benefit by its profits, have retained
essentially the same economic relationship to it that they had before
the transaction. The fact that they may eventually yield that ownership
does not warrant the same tax treatment as if they had already trans-
ferred ownership. It is equally decisive for purposes of the charitable
exemption statutes whether Owner is receiving "purchase price pay-
ments" as a creditor or is still so involved in the operation and success
of the business that the payments are essentially a "return of profits."
In the latter event there will be "private inurement" of the income of
the business, a fact which the statute ' declares to be fatal to tax
exemption.
If the conclusion is accepted that the transaction, even though not
a complete "sham," ought not be recognized as a "sale" for tax pur-
poses, and that Owners' receipts should be treated as ordinary income,
how shall Owner be given appropriate tax recognition for the cost basis
of his investment? In most of the bootstrap cases there will be an
eventual transfer-over of ownership when the payments are completed.
Therefore, Owners would appear entitled to the recovery of their cost
basis in view of the principles spelled out in decisions such as Eisner v.
Macomber." Perhaps the easiest and most acceptable method of treat-
61 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(6), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (c) (3)).
62 1nt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 50, as amended (now INT.
Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222).
63 nt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(6), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended.
64252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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ing Owners' basis is to permit it to be amortized over the combined
downpayment and periodic payments. While there is no statutory
authority, amortization seems more satisfactory than compelling Owner
to wait for the recovery of his basis until the ultimate transfer-over is
completed. 5 This combination of ordinary income treatment and re-
covery of basis is a recognition of the hybrid character of these trans-
actions, and of the fact that they include a type of "sale" element.
Institutional Factors Involved
Several aspects of these cases reflect the institutional nature of the
taxing process. In Knapp Bros., the Justice Department based its argu-
ment primarily on the lack of a fair market value. Yet the boom in the
shoe business which had started right after the transaction and had
resulted in the notes being paid off years early made this a futile line of
approach. The error is in part explained by inadequate correlation of
the work of Internal Revenue and Justice. To this element of the
Knapp case must be coupled the advantage to taxpayers who can afford
to pay their tax in advance of being able to invoke the refund jurdis-
diction of the less expert, and more sympathetic, Court of Claims.
Some of the Commissioner's mis-steps in the bootstrap litigation
reflect a lack of administrative coordination that may be attributable
to excessive decentralization. In Ohio Furnace, the Commissioner
failed even to inquire into the important issue of fair market value.
Similarly, the Commissioner's argument in Truschel centered on
the relatively ineffective, and somewhat formal claim that a bootstrap
transaction is a "reorganization" 66 and that the downpayment is
"boot." Inadequate emphasis was placed on the broad substance over
form approach of Kolkey. And although Kolkey was obviously a test
case for the area, Ohio Furnace was permitted to come to trial first, and
without the extensive preparation which Kolkey received.
The Relationship Between the Bootstrap Decisions
and Basic Tax Principles
A number of supposedly basic income tax doctrines are at issue
in the charitable bootstrap cases:
65 Although it might also be argued that Owner should be able to treat the first
payments received as recovery of his basis on the authority of Burnet v. Logan, 283
U.S. 404 (1931), that case is both doubtful authority, and of doubtful relevance here.
Logan was essentially based on the uncertainty of various types of engineering esti-
mates, a premise that is no longer factually sound. It is difficult to see why Owner's
basis must be recovered first in a lump sum, since he can be permitted to recover
it proportionately over the income received.
66 The reorganization approach is considered in some detail at text accompanying
notes 163-65 infra.
TAX EROSION AND THE BOOTSTRAP SALE
(1) Exemption from taxation is reserved for organizations and
funds which are devoted primarily to public purposes,"7 and is denied
(a) if organizations or funds are devoted primarily or significantly to
private purposes,68 (b) if organizations are operated on a commercial
basis in competition with ordinary business,6" or (c) if funds are un-
reasonably accumulated without being currently used for public
purposes. 0
(2) A "sale" for capital gains purposes is not satisfied by the bare
transfer of legal title but requires a meaningful economic transfer,71 and
such a meaningful transfer has not occurred where the former owner
continues to (a) control the business, 2 or (b) assume the risk of the
business' profits and losses, 73 and certainly not where Owner keeps
both control and risk.74
(3) Capital gains treatment is particularly intended to apply to
transfers of "investment" type assets and to prevent the bunching up in
one year, at progressive rates, of income earned over a number of
years. 75  Or conversely, capital gains treatment is not appropriate for
the recurrent receipt of commercial or business income, particularly
where the recipient is in an entrepreneurial or proprietary relationship
to the income source.
76
(4) In determining the tax consequences of a transaction its mere
form cannot be made to control, but the full factual nature and economic
significance of what occurred, including the relationships between the
parties, will be taken into account.
77
67 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(6), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended; Better
Business Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
68Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(6), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended; Universal
Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950).
69 See Better Business Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945);
United States v. Community Servs., Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 932 (1952).
7 0 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3814, added by ch. 994, § 331, 64 Stat. 957 (1950)
(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 504); Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 128.
71 See Burnet v. Harmel,'287 U.S. 103 (1932) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376
(1930); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
928 (1952).
72 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940).
73 See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956) ; Good-
ing Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
74 See Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
75 See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) ; Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U.S. 103 (1932).
76 See Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Bloch
v. United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 935 (1953).
7 7 See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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One might expect the violation of any one of these supposedly basic
principles to be fatal to a taxpayer's case. Yet even when the original
bootstrap deals transgressed them all the Commissioner did not prevail,
except in Kolkey. What is the significance of this failure by a number
of courts to observe what seem to be basic principles? Are the bootstrap
cases unique in this respect? Are these principles given effect generally?
Or are they mere tax myths, proclaimed but not practiced? In order
to seek some of the answers to some of these questions, the effectiveness
of these basic principles will be examined in other contexts.
V. "SALES" AND THE RETENTION OF OWNERSHIP
There is one other formal assumption concealed in an approach
based on "sale" or "no sale." This is the insistence that a transaction
be analyzed solely from the standpoint of the initial transfer. If this
original event is classified as a "sale," then the prevailing judicial use
of legal concepts requires all subsequent receipts to be treated as sale
receipts, no matter what the recipient's actual relationship to the
business and the nature of those receipts. And to ask "sale or no sale,"
also assumes that ownership is unitary, that any transfer of ownership
necessarily transfers all the aspects of ownership. But where the
multiple incidents of ownership are recognized and where a transfer
may include some but not all of them, thinking habits which require
that an entire transaction be fitted within a single label are no longer
adequate.
Transactions which, like the bootstraps, seek to achieve a sufficient
transfer of the business so that Owners will not be treated as owners
for tax purposes, while retaining for Owners the enjoyment of the
primary incidents of ownership, take their root in these conceptual
approaches. To inquire whether the former owner retains the basic
enterpreneurial attributes of risk and control seems both more realistic,
and more decisive, than whether title has passed, words of sale were
used, or the transaction otherwise fits within the label of a common-
law "sale." 78
78 See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Corliss v. Bowers,
281 U.S. 376 (1930) ; White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 928 (1952). See also Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code--Sales;
Should It Be Eacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 827 (1950): The Uniform Sales Act and
the Uniform Commercial Code "differ primarily in this, that the Code everywhere
puts more emphasis upon the operative facts on which stated legal results depend
and warns us that those legal results are not determined by such undefined concepts
as 'title' or 'property in the goods.' By such emphasis and warning, the attention
of both merchant and lawyer are focussed on the vitally important factors and not on
the undefined and inoperative concepts."
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The real nature of Owner's relationship to the business after the
transaction must be explored. Is it a basic principle that retention of
the risks of the business or retention of control or both will be treated
as ownership for tax purposes? And are such principles effectively
applied by the taxing process?
Retention of Risk
Several major lines of cases deal with the effects of retention of
risk in ways that appear to be related or analogous to the bootstrap
problem. These include the "economic interest" cases in the natural
resources area, the cases in which an effort is made to apply economic
interest principles of retention of risk to the transfer of patent rights,
and the "thin capitalization" cases. Furthermore, the effort to apply
"reorganization" doctrines to the bootstrap transactions rests, in part,
on similar principles.
The Economic Interest Doctrine
The primary function of the "economic interest" concept"7 has
been to determine who possesses such an ownership interest with respect
to a wasting natural resource as to be entitled to cost or percentage
depletion. 0 Since the essential rationalization for percentage depletion
has been stated in terms of furnishing an "incentive" to the risk-taking
entrepreneur in the natural resources field,"' the concept may be par-
ticularly relevant to the ownership implications of the retention of
risk. 2
7 9 See BREEDING & BURTON, TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INCOME (1954);
MILLER, OIL AND GAS; FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (3d ed. 1957); Baker, The
Nature of Depletable Income, 7 TAX L. REv. 267 (1952); Rowen, Introduction to
Oil and Gas Interests, 34 TAXES 19 (1956); Sneed, The Economic Interest-An
Expanding Concept, 35 TExAs L. REV. 307 (1957).
8 0 The doctrine has been developed primarily in the oil and gas cases, but is
equally applicable to other types of natural resources such as coal or sulphur. Sneed,
supra note 79, at 308. The group of Supreme Court decisions in Commissioner v.
P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), included a sulphur case in its holding that
"sales" of "carved out" production payments result in depletable ordinary income,
and the strip mining cases apply economic interest concepts to coal, G.C.M. 26290,
1950-1 Cum. BULL. 42, 44.
81 Baker & Griswold, Percentage Depletion, A Correspondence, 1955 Com-
PENDIUM: 877; Gonzales, Percentage Depletion for Petroleum Production, 1959-2
TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 985; Lambert, Percentage Depletion and Exploration
and Development Costs, 1959-2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1009; Lambert, Per-
centage Depletion and the National Interest, 1955 COMPENDIUM 449; Smith, Tax
Policy as Reflected in Statutory Percentage Depletion for Oil and Gas, 1955 Com-
PENDIUM 484; Stanley, The Independent Producer's Position, 1955 COMPENDIUM 474.
8 2 This discussion is directed only at some of the more general implications of
the economic interest doctrine. Its more technical aspects are considered by the
materials cited in note 79 supra.
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In natural resource law the line between a "sale" and a "lease" is
often obscure, resembling the "sale or no sale" dilemma of the boot-
strap. Until very recently,83 the economic interest concept has served to
distinguish "sale" from "lease," thereby determining both that the pos-
sessor of an economic interest is entitled to depletion, and that his
income is ordinary income rather than capital gains.
The Oil and Gas Lease
The typical oil and gas lease involves a transaction in which the
landowner conveys rights to explore for and develop mineral property in
return for a cash downpayment, called a "bonus," and either a retained
"royalty" or a "production payment" or both. A royalty is the right
to receive a certain percentage of the proceeds of mineral exploitation,
usually a one-eighth interest. A production payment (or "in-oil pay-
ment" as it is sometimes called) is the right to receive a specified amount
out of a certain fraction of production, for example, "$1,QOO,000 out
of the first 8 of oil and gas produced and saved.", Unlike the royalty
holder, the interest of the holder of a production payment will ordinarily
terminate before the end of the particular oil and gas lease.
Burnet v. Harmel and Palmer v. Bender
In Burnet v. Harmel,84 S, the owner of oil lands, leased them to F
for cash bonus payments and royalties measured by production. The
Supreme Court denied capital gains for the bonuses, commenting that
with every oil lease ownership of the oil passes from S to F at some time,
S being compensated by the payments. The Court pointed out that to
tax S at ordinary income rates does not involve the hardship of "bunch-
ing" of income at progressive rates that the capital gains provisions of
the 1921 Revenue Act were aimed at, for extraction of oil takes time,
and payments are not usually made in just one year. The broad prin-
ciple stated by Harmel is that even though a particular transfer is called
(or held by state law to be 85) a "sale," the fact that the owner's income
is dependent on production and comes to him recurrently over a period
of more than one year, means that the owner has retained a sufficient
"economic interest" in the oil and gas in place, so that capital gains
treatment is inappropriate even for the initial cash bonus. The infer-
ence is that Owner has retained the entrepreneurial risks of the
business.
83 See Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.
1957), and the related group of cases cited note 104 infra.
84 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
85 Under Texas law such a mineral lease was in effect a "sale," as the Supreme
Court noted.
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In Palmer v. Bender,8" the contracts provided that certain leased
oil property be "sold" to F, S getting a cash bonus, an oil payment
and a one-eighth royalty. The Commissioner denied depletion, holding
the transaction a sale. But the Supreme Court stated:
"[L]essor's right to a depletion allowance does not depend upon
his retention of ownership or any other particular form of legal
interest in the mineral content of the land. It is enough if
he has retained a right to share in the oil produced. ,,'8"
This also recognizes-although still not very explicitly-the eco-
nomic risk idea. The Court stressed that destruction of the oil before
completing extraction would have caused a loss to S. In the traditional
sale, of course, the risk is ordinarily assumed to pass to the buyer.
However the case'also appears to view an economic interest as almost a
physical share of the mineral in place."8 This last idea (that the eco-
nomic interest is in the wasting mineral in place) and the continued
.emphasis of a number of oil and gas decisions on "sale" or "lease" have
precipitated some confusion by their inconsistency with the emerging
principle of economic risk.
In Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Dev. Co., 9 for example, S conveyed
oil rights and equipment to F for $2 million payable over five years,
after which S was td receive one-third of the monthly net profits.
Depletion was denied to S, the Court emphasizing explicit language of
"sale" in the" contract, calling the net profits royalty a mere personal
promise to pay, and holding the transaction an absolute "sale." Elbe
reflects an emphasis on "sale" language and the "sale or lease" approach
to these problems. The opinion also stresses the importance of retention
of a physical share of the mineral." Similarly, in Helvering v.
O'Donnell,9 where S sold one-third of his stock in the X oil company
to F for a one-third net profits royalty, depletion was denied, in part
on the reasoning that S, as only a shareholder of X, had no legal
"privity" with the property. If this were sound then no one who pur-
chased a royalty or acquired it by gift or devise would have an economic
86287 U.S. 551 (1933).
8 287 U.S. at 557.
8SLynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925), treated an economic
interest as a physical share of the mineral, and it took a good deal of judicial history
to change this.
89 303 U.S. 372 (1938).
90 A net profits royalty does not literally involve a physical share of the mineral.
The courts had early started whittling down this idea that an economic interest was
based on a physical share. Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Snydicate, 293 U.S. 312
(1934), grants depletion whether royalties are paid in cash or kind.
91303 U.S. 370 (1938).
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interest. This artificial "privity" doctrine was in effect overruled by the
result in Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co."2
O'Donnell also held the net profits royalty to be a mere personal
promise to pay-again emphasizing the supposed need for a physical
share of the mineral. The weakness of the argument is revealed by
inquiring as to who would be liable on this "promise" and in what
amount, if there were no production. Both Elbe Oil and O'Donnell are
in effect overruled on this issue by Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commis-
sioner " and Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner," which grant
depletion to a net profits royalty. Kirby and Burton-Sutton emphasize
that an economic interest is not mere title to the mineral in place, but is
dependency for the possibility of profit "solely upon the extraction and
sale of the oil." "
The Treatment of Production Payments
Oil and gas royalties were treated as analogous to rentals, and
depletable, since they were a percentage of production extending over
the entire life of the wasting asset. With an oil payment there would
often be oil left in the ground after the money payment was completed,
which remainder would then belong to the lessee or other transferee.
That is, the original owner in the case of the oil payment eventually
yields all interest in the asset (oil and gas interests) transferred. This
difference between an oil payment and a royalty led the courts into con-
ceptual difficulties over "sale" versus "lease" very similar to the boot-
strap problem of "sale" or "no sale." Thus, in Commissioner v.
Fleming,"6 where oil and gas interests were transferred in return for a
cash consideration and an oil payment, the court held "that part of the
income arose from a sale of a capital asset and was not subject to a
depletion allowance [the cash], and that part of it arose from the
operation of the oil wells and was so subject." 17 This in effect treats
the transaction as a hybrid, part "sale" and part "lease," the cash
receiving sale treatment and the oil payment being held an economic
interest. This treatment was adopted, at least as concerns the oil
92350 U.S. 308 (1956).
93326 U.S. 599 (1946).
94328 U.S. 25 (1946). The effect of undue emphasis on precedent is perhaps
illustrated by the failure of the Supreme Court expressly to state that Elbe Oil had
been overruled, although Kirby and Burton-Sutton are directly contrary. One
result may have been the persistence of the Elbe Oil result in decisions such as
Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957),
and the related group of cases cited note 104 infra.
95 326 U.S. at 604.
96 82 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1936).
971d. at 327. (Emphasis added.)
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payment, by the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Perkins,"8 involving a
similar factual problem. There the court talked of the transaction as
an "assignment" but held the oil payment a depletable economic interest.
The Fleming holding, that the cash payment was to be treated as
"sales" proceeds in a transaction characterized by Owner's retaining
the right to a present, recurrent receipt of commercial income from the
business of oil production (the oil payment), is illustrative of the
difficulties caused both for oil and gas decisions and the bootstrap area
by attempting to determine results on the basis of a label such as "sale"
rather than by the total relationship between the parties. However, the
ordinary income treatment applied to the oil payment despite the fact
that the original owner will eventually yield all ownership is significant
as a solution to a legal situation that is particularly close to the boot-
strap problem.
The Source of Payment
In Anderson v. Helvering,99 Owner transferred mineral interests
and land for cash and an oil payment to be paid out of half the oil
produced and from the sale of any of the land. Depletion was denied
since payment could come from the sale of the land, the court seeing this
as the equivalent of a personal guarantee by the lessee that the payment
would equal the specified sum.
It might be argued that since Owner, in a bootstrap case, receives
notes in a specific amount containing an absolute promise by Feeder to
pay, that under Anderson, an economic risk approach would not apply.
If Owner does have a substantial independent source of payment de-
tached from the risks of the business, the economic risk argument is not
applicable. However a mere formal paper contract signed by Feeder,
an entity with little or no assets, appears to have no more substance than
does the fact that the contract itself is headed "Sale."
The same comment applies to the Anderson dictum with respect
to a personal guarantee by the lessee. Ordinarily, the lessee in an oil
and gas case is the individual responsible for the primary drilling or
operating functions, a contracting party with resources and assets. A
personal guarantee from such a person has meaning in the context of
the oil and gas industry. That is far different from Feeder's personal
guarantee in the bootstrap cases, where Feeder is little more than an
empty shell.
98301 U.S. 655 (1937).
99310 U.S. 404 (1940).
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Economic Interest Doctrine and the Depletion Rationale
The emphasis in depletion has tended progressively to focus on
furnishing an "incentive" and reward to those who take the entre-
preneurial risks necessary to develop and market natural resources.
The development of the doctrine of economic interest (the prerequisite
for depletion) has inclined away from merely recognizing and com-
pensating initial capital investment. Despite the language in the
decisions with respect to recovery of a wasting capital investment, the
courts are more and more frankly recognizing an incentive stimulus
to the true economic owners and entrepreneurs as a concurrent objective
of depletion.'0° The Supreme Court's recent depletion decision, Com-
nissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., contains the statement:
"The present allowance, [percentage depletion], however, bears
little relationship to the capital investment, and the taxpayer is not
limited to a recoupment of his original investment. The allow-
ance continues so long as minerals are extracted, and even though
no money was actually invested in the deposit." 101
When this is read together with the emphasis in Harmel upon
dependency on production and in Palmer v. Bender on ownership of
a share of production, the subordination of the capital investment factor
to the risk factor becomes apparent. The Supreme Court in South-
west Exploration has really merged these two requirements of "de-
pendency on production" and "capital investment"-a development far
beyond the early emphasis on an "investment" as a mere physical share
of the mineral. In other words, wherever one has such an ownership
type of economic share as to be dependent on the fortunes of mineral
production, it is essentially a capital investment. Dependency on the
100 The fact that mineral owners are getting not merely a "stimulus" but an extra-
ordinary subsidy in recognition of their broad political power is not reflected in the
decisions at all. There is no discernible effort by the courts to limit or narrow the
depletion deduction in any way, despite widespread criticism of its effects on the
equity of our tax structure, as well as on concentration of wealth and power generally.
See the statement by Senator Proxmire on the floor of the Senate including detailed
statistics on the effects of depletion in reducing oil and gas tax rates below that of
other industries and in permitting high bracket taxpayers to pay little or no tax.
105 CONG. REc. 7892-7914 (daily ed. May 21, 1959); Gray, Percentage Depletion
Conservation and Economic Structure, 1955 COMPENDIUM 430; Gray, Tax Reform
and the Depletion Allowance, 1959-2 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 979; Harberger,
The Taxation of Mineral Industries, 1955 COMPENDIUM 439; Lubar, A Plan for Tax
Reform, Fortune, March 1959, pp. 92, 236, 238; Rudick, Depletion and Exploration
Costs, 1959-2 TAx REvIsION COMPENDIUM 983; Hearings on Revenue Revision of
1950 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-60,
177-219 (1950). Yet, as will be noted later in text, doctrines which cut the other
way have been quickly trimmed back by judicial interpretation, e.g., "sales and lease-
backs," "thin capitalization," and Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 45, ch. 1, 53 Stat. 25;
§ 129, added by ch. 63, 58 Stat. 47 (1944).
101 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
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risks of production or ownership of an economic share of production
have become but two sides of the same coin.
Current Problems
However, at least one current development in economic interest
law indicates a trend away from any symmetrical "o approach grounded
on economic risk. Typical of a group of recent circuit and lower court
decisions which emphasize that the down payment is substantial in
amount and that "sales" language is used in the instrument, and which
thereupon accord capital gains treatment to the transaction, is Crowell
Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner.03  There, all sand and gravel
under the property was "sold" to an operator who had five years to
remove the sand and gravel, paying the owner for it at fifteen cents a
yard; then the operator was to reconvey to Owner. In other words,
Owner retained a royalty of fifteen cents for each yard produced, the
fact that the royalty was computed on the basis of x cents a yard not
changing its essential character as a retained share of production, and
the agreement to reconvey further emphasized that Owner was not ulti-
mately giving up ownership. The Tax Court found a mineral "lease"
and ordinary income. The Fifth Circuit held "sale" and capital gains.
2
02 It is not intended to give the impression that because there has been some
symmetry in the Supreme Court's development of the economic interest doctrine, that
oil and gas taxation itself is in anything but a state of doubt, due primarily to the
flood of decisions giving special tax relief. This is particularly true of oil and gas
tax decisions in the Fifth Circuit. Thus when the Treasury was drafting legislation
to tax the transfer of "carved out oil payments" at ordinary income rates, the Fifth
Circuit suddenly discovered that such transfers are anticipatory assignments of income,
Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956). But after the possibility of
legislation had evaporated, the Fifth Circuit rediscovered the basic truth that a
transfer of a "carved out oil payment!' is a capital gains "sale," Commissioner v.
Wrather, 241 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 241 F.2d
71 (5th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Weed, 241 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1957); Scofield
v. O'Connor, 241 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1957). (All four of these decisions were reversed
by the Supreme Court, Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958)).
There are many oil and gas tax doctrines that are difficult to reconcile with the
supposed basic principles of oil and gas taxation and of income taxation generally.
The following authorities stand for the propositions that payment of the cost of
"lifting" someone else's oil is a deductible expenditure, see Special Ruling, May 15,
1956, CCH 1956 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 6608; that a de minimis amount of pro-
duction suffices to guard against restoration of a bonus to income, see Crabb v.
Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 686 (1940), acq., 1940-2 Cum. BULL. 2, aff'd on other
grounds, 119 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1941); that "minimum royalties" are depletable,
see McFaddin v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 395 (1943), acq., 1943 Cum. BULL. 16,
aff'd in part and remanded, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945) ; that the sale of a royalty
or an ordinary oil payment is entitled to capital gains, see J. E. Thompson v. Com-
missioner, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 612 (1948); and see Rev. Rul. 55-526, 1955-2
Cum. BULL. 574; I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 10; that "delay rentals" are de-
ductible, see United States v. Dougan, 214 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1954); and that
"ordinary treatment processes" include manufacturing, see Dragon Cement Co. v.
United States, 244 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957). These
are primarily based upon decisions at the lower court level, although the Supreme
Court's failure to pass upon these doctrines has played an important role.
103 242 F2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 223 (1955).
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Crowell Land is an example of "sale-lease" formalism, as are
others in the same line of decision."' Its holding resembles Elbe Oil,
which is doubtful authority in the Supreme Court today. Economic
interest controversies are frequently between taxpayers over depletion,
rather than between Government and taxpayer. Whatever symmetry
the economic interest doctrine has achieved is due to this and to deple-
tion itself, whose special advantages reduce the pressure for other forms
of erosion. Here in Crowell Land, where the issue was not taxpayer
versus taxpayer 105 over depletion but the question of capital gains
treatment for ordinary income, the "sale" concept suddenly showed up
again.
The contrast between the Supreme Court's general economic inter-
est approach and the Crowell Land line of cases appears to support
another observation. That is that the process of judicial erosion of
basic tax principles has been centered in the lower courts. Less per-
suaded, perhaps, by the myth that we have a system of steeply progres-
sive taxes, the Supreme Court has been more reluctant 106 to focus
attention on the relief of individual taxpayers rather than on the public
interest in a uniform level of progressive taxation.
The Economic Interest Doctrine and the Bootstrap Cases
While the economic interest cases are persuasive authority with
respect to a substantial retention of risk, they do not speak to all boot-
strap issues. The economic interest doctrine does not treat income as
104 Commissioner v. Remer, 260 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1958); Barker v. Commis-
sioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957) ; M. W. Olinger, 27 T.C. 93 (1956) ; Arthur N.
Trembley, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 972 (1948). But see Albritton v. Commissioner,
248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957) ; West v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946). Note that some of those cases emphasize a sub-
jective "purpose" of mineral production, which is essentially irrelevant to the economic
interest doctrine. While these cases emphasize "sale" or "lease," they frequently
involve situations that are mostly "sale," with the retained economic interest being
minor. Still these are at the most hybrids like Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655
(1937), and it is difficult to see why economic interest income should get capital
gains treatment.
105The "strip mining" cases such as Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959),
are mostly taxpayer versus taxpayer with the Commissioner seeking only to avoid
being "whipsawed." The Supreme Court's denial of depletion to the stripper is
realistic in result-the stripper being closer to an employee or independent contractor
than to an entrepreneur. However, the decisions rely on some artificial criteria such
as the ability to terminate the arrangement on short notice and the failure of the
stripper to share in the sales proceeds. These reflect the formalistic standards listed
in G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 42, and will probably produce further litigation.
106 Decisions in a number of the legal areas to be considered below support the
view that the Supreme Court has been more inclined than the lower courts to uphold
the claimed basic doctrine that income shall be taxed at progressively increasing
rates to the taxpayer who earned it. This is illustrated by the greater tendency of
Supreme Court decisions to emphasize the substance rather than the form of the
transactions at stake in various of the areas to be considered.
[Vol.108:623
TAX EROSION AND THE BOOTSTRAP SALE
first being run through a corporate entity, with profits being redis-
tributed to the equity owners, as occurs with an ordinary business.
Rather, economic interest doctrine, in theory, sees production as
"shared" among the various owners of the economic interest. The
income thus shared is seen as belonging to and retained by the owner
of the original economic interest at all times, rather than as ever passing
through an artificial entity such as Feeder. In other words, if a cor-
porate oil producer pays the landowner a one-eighth royalty, the
royalty amount is completely excluded from corporate income. But
dividends are paid only after the corporation has paid a tax on the
income that produced them, and a dividend is not excluded from cor-
porate income. As long as Feeder and its sub-entities are not seen as
sham and as long as there really was a transfer to them, then it seems
clear that the income of the business does pass through Feeder or its
sub-corporations as the operating entities for the business and is taxable
to them.
The Effort to Apply the Economic Interest Approach to Patent Cases
The Government has attempted to apply the economic interest
approach outside of the oil and gas area, but with little success. This
effort was made principally in the patent field."0 7 Patents, while an
income producing asset, are not, per se, an active business and differ
thereby from most of the bootstrap cases; but their transfer ordinarily
does involve the retention of risk. The only bootstrap cases which have
not involved an active business included one patent transaction which
was the subject of a revenue ruling 108 and one oil payment case.' 09
Where oil and gas rights are "leased", the landowner-lessor is
seen as having joined in a type of quasi-partnership or joint venture,
and as having thrown his mineral rights into the "sharing pot." 110
The lessee is viewed as contributing the know-how and the expense
necessary to discover, develop and produce the mineral resource, and
its related business income.
107 Bailey, The Inventor, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 285 (1957) ; DeBois,
Patents and Taxation, 70YLA. L. REv. 416 (1954); Frost, Tax Consequences of
Patent Transfers, 7 STAN. L. REv. 349 (1955) ; Joseph, Tax Treatment of Sales and
Licenses of Patents, 32 TAXES 803 (1954) ; Pavitt, Patents Under Code Section 1235,
33 TAXES 265 (1955); Note, A "Sale or Exchange" of Patent Rights for Federal
Income Tax Purposes, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 457 (1955); Note, Comparison of
the Tax Treatment of Authors and Inventors, 70 HAsv. L. REv. 1419 (1957).
108 This transaction involved a bootstrap-type transfer of rights to royalties from
the miracle drug, sulfa, to a family controlled, thinly capitalized foundation. For a
discussion see Hearings on the Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws Before
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
1365-1539 (1953).
109 Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955).
110 G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214.
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This explains the economic interest doctrine's gradual expansion,
in the oil and gas cases, into an economic risk approach. One might
have expected an analogous development with patent royalties."1 There
could not be a much more typical entrepreneurial venture than an in-
vention, whose patent the inventor transfers to a corporation to develop,
taking back a share in the profits in return. The inventor shares in
the business exploitation of the patent in much the same way as does
an oil and gas lessor, and often much more actively: an inventor
frequently participates in the development of his invention and may
sometimes control the transferee company, while the landlord-lessor
rarely participates in production. But despite the close parallel, the
principles of retention of risk developed by the Supreme Court in the
economic interest cases were not applied to patent royalties. It is now
established that patent royalties will be taxed only as "capital gains."
The evolution of capital gains treatment for patent transfers-a
primary product of judicial emphasis on the formalities of transfer-
is typical of judicial erosion generally. The courts failed to consider
either the relationship between the inventor and the commercial de-
velopment of the patent, or the inventor's regular receipt of a share of
the profits. A dictum in the Supreme Court case of Waterman v.
Mackenzie .. treated a transfer of patent rights as an "assignment"
rather than a "license," if the documents included the transfer of the
rights to "make, use and sell." Thereafter the lower courts decided
cases by whether these ritual words were employed, rather than in terms
of the realities." 3  The Commissioner, too, initially treated patent
transfers as formally as the courts, basing his arguments on the "assign-
ment-license" dichotomy." 4 When he finally recognized where the
III See Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, 1959-1 TAx REvisiox Comt-
PENDIUM 19, which utilizes portions of the analysis herein set forth (regarding
patents and regarding Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 45, ch. 1, 53 Stat. 25) in illustration
of the general problem of tax erosion.
112 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
13 Hofferbert v. Briggs, 178 F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Lamar v. Granger, 99
F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl.
1953) ; Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153 (1948). In fact, the courts did not even follow
their own standard consistently, where a different interpretation proved necessary in
order to give capital gains treatment. Thus, in Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th
Cir. 1951), where a contract transferring patent rights said "manufacture and sell,"
the court held that the contract was "ambiguous" and used the parol evidence rule
to read in the word "use." Accord, Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634 (4th
Cir. 1957), where, as in Howes' Estate, the court cited the principle of substance over
form in support of a decision which emphasized form over substance. A number of
other cases grant capital gains treatment despite the failure to include the right to
"use" or the right to "sell." Lawrence v. United States, 242 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1957) ;
A. E. Hichman, 29 T.C. 864 (1958); Rose Marie Reid, 26 T.C. 622 (1956); Monie
S. Hudson, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 284 (1957).
114 The Commissioner acquiesced in Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946), acq.,
1958-2 Cum. BULL. 6, where the licensee got an exclusive right to "make, use and sell"
in return for royalties of a percentage of the sales price.
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substance of the relationship lay and used an economic interest approach
to argue that the inventor was regularly receiving the profits from a
patent business, it was too late; this new approach,115 although it pre-
vailed in Bloch v. United States,"6 the first case in which it was tried,
was generally rejected by the courts.11
The patent decisions seem extreme, even ignoring for the moment
the question of how workable the "capital gains" concept is. By almost
any approach except asking "What is the proper label for the trans-
action ?," the receipt of royalties as a result of a patent transfer repre-
sents a sharing in the profits of a basic business activity. These judi-
cial decisions, however, soon produced the chain reaction that so often
explains tax erosion. The "make, use, sell" cases lent respectability to
a result that Congress might have hesitated to initiate on its own.
Congress closed the book on the patent litigation, for all practical
purposes, by the amendments to the Internal Revenue Code designed
to make certain that patent royalties were treated as capital gain."'
The statutes adopt the approach of the cases. Sections 1235 of
the 1954 Code and 117(q) of the 1939 Code emphasize whether "sub-
stantial rights" were transferred pursuant to the "assignment," rather
than the nature and source of the income or the relationship of the
transferor to the business. The reasons for such legislation must be
evaluated in light of the fact that copyrights are specifically denied
115 Stated in Mimeo 6490, 1950-1 Cum. BuLL. 9.
116200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 935 (1953).
117 See the decisions cited in notes 113-14 supra. And see General Spring Corp.,
12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 847 (1953), where it was particularly evident that the
"transferor" had continued to participate in the business of exploiting the patent.
The Internal Revenue Service won several cases after Mimeo 6490 (see note 115
supra and accompanying text) was issued but it had no real effect on the taxation
of patent transfers. Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1953), was even
based on the "assignment-license" approach. The documents read "make and sell"
not "make, use and sell," and later cases distinguished it thereby. Several other
cases did apply ordinary income treatment to transfers of copyrights or patents,
Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949) ; Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d
63 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 935 (1953); Misbourne Pictures Ltd. v.
Johnson, 189 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1951). But these were distinguished by cases such
as First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1955), and Kronner
v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl. 1953), on the doubtful argument that
they applied only to the nonresident alien statutes. The court in First Nat'l Bank,
also stated that a provision for the payment of royalties did not bar the argument
that the parties intended "title to pass."
118 IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235. In 1955 the Commissioner issued Rev. Rul.
55-58, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 97, interpreting the capital gains policy of § 1235 not to
apply before its effective date in 1954. The Commissioner is understood to have so
ruled because at the time there were a number of the original bootstrap cases pending
in the courts, and his approach was in part based on the economic interest doctrine.
But Congress reacted immediately by enacting § 117(q) of the 1939 Code, added by
ch. 464, § 1, 70 Stat 404 (1956), in the same language as § 1235, and made its capital
gains treatment applicable to payments of patent royalties after May 31, 1950 (the
effective date of Mimeo 6490), regardless of the year in which the transfer occurred.
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capital gains treatment 119 although they present precisely the same
problem of retention of income from personal services as do patents.
The significant distinction appears to lie in the greater influence of the
patent lobby.
Some final comments. The foregoing analysis assumed the situa-
tion most favorable to those arguments of economic "stimuli" and
"incentive" basic to the capital gains myth. The patent transfer was
assumed to be made by the hardy individual inventor struggling on the
frontiers of knowledge. One's view of the equities must be readjusted
to the realization that most patents are procured by the major corpora-
tions and the giant commercial laboratories.
Furthermore, tax policy can never be viewed in isolation. It is a
very special advantage to have to report only one-half of one's income
from the exploitation of a patent, and to have a maximum tax rate
of twenty-five per cent (capital gains treatment). This special ad-
vantage, which is primarily available and valuable to the upper bracket
taxpayer I" must be appraised in terms of the more general political
and economic problem of patent monopoly and concentration of eco-
nomic power.
121
The Thin Capitalization Cases
"Thin capitalization" is still another way to preserve the essential
advantages of ownership while avoiding the formal appearance of
ownership and its related tax consequences. The technique is to set
up a close corporation with very little "equity" capital and a relatively
large "debt." The major tax advantages sought include (a) recovery
of the investment by repayment of a "loan" without the risk that this
will be held a redemption "essentially equivalent to a dividend"
under section 302 of the 1954 Code, and (b) the ability of the
corporation to deduct payments as interest, although they would not be
deductible if viewed as dividends. But where the capital of such a
company is too "thin" to afford the reasonable assurance of independent
payment characteristic of a debt, so that the holder of the security must
depend on the risks of the business, he is in a position similar to a
shareholder.
119 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231(b) (1) (C).
120 The fact that capital gains treatment primarily benefits the upper bracket
taxpayer is considered in notes 308-11, 314-17 infra and accompanying text as part of
a brief discussion of the implications of the capital gains doctrine.
121 Among the literature which considers the general impact of the special treat-
ment given patents is ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 223-60; HAMILTON,
PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (TNEC Monograph No. 31, 1941); Rich, The
Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 422 (1942).
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This doctrine is relevant to two closely related ways of approach-
ing the basic bootstrap problem: 122 (1) Has Owner formally divorced
himself from the fortunes of the business, and become a mere creditor,
or is he still-in substance-so dependent on the risks and profits of
the business as to retain his beneficial ownership? (2) More tech-
nically, are the notes or bonds received by Owner to be treated as
really stock, making the payments equity distributions, 23 or are they
the debt instruments they purport to be, making the payments purchase
price payments ?
The notes or bonds issued in a thin capitalization are in a fixed
amount and, presumably, will be paid off eventually, while the owner of
stock may receive a share of the profits indefinitely. This parallels the
contrast between the oil payment with its fixed sum and the oil royalty
with its indefinite percentage of the income. The bootstrap transfer
itself more closely resembles an oil payment than any other usual legal
category. The problem of how to tax an oil payment was resolved by
treating the receipts as ordinary depletable income; 124 the equivalent
of cost depletion would be provided in a bootstrap case if Owner were
permitted to amortize his cost basis over the total payments received,
which would then be taxed as ordinary income.
Judicial Approaches to the Thin Capitalisation Problem
The Supreme Court has recognized the problem of thin capitaliza-
tion in a widely quoted obiter dictum: "As material amounts of capital
were invested in stock, we need not consider the effect of extreme
situations such as nominal stock investments and an obviously exces-
sive debt structure." 125 But on the whole the judicial treatment 126 of
122 Of course, the absence of notes in the lease-type bootstraps means that there
is no thin capitalization issue. But the bootstrap technique is built upon the sepa-
ration of the form and the fact of ownership, and like any bootstrap the lease type
must retain ownership risks. Lease bootstraps can not make use of the device of
"notes" backed only by profits, because the operating entities in the lease cases are
not penniless individuals; they ordinarily have assets which would be obligated if
a note were signed. Resort must be had to the other major technique for making
a purchase without committing substantial assets-payment out of a percentage of
business income. This makes explicit what the use of notes obscured-that Owners
have kept the ownership risks. Perhaps this will make the situation more clear to
the courts than it apparently was in the original bootstraps.
123 This ties in to the effort, considered later, to classify a bootstrap transfer
as a "reorganization." See text accompanying notes 163-65 infra.
124 Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937).
125 John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).
126 The commentaries include AL, FEDERAL INcoME, ESTATE, & GIFT TAXATION
-INcomE TAx PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 56-63, 398-437 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as 1958 ALl STUDY] ; ADVISORY GRoup ON SuBCHAPTER C OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, REVISED REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
AND ADJUSTMENTS (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 ADVISoRY GRour REPORT], in
Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, I, and K of the
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thin capitalization by the lower courts has displayed the same type of
formalism seen with bootstrap and patent transfers. All too often the
courts have asked "what label applies to this particular instrument,
'debt' or 'equity' ?" rather than "on all the facts, what is the nature of
the relationship between the taxpayer and the corporation evidenced by
this document?" A mere grouping of the cases by approach is
illustrative.
(1) Some cases asked: is the instrument a "stock" or a
"bond" ? 127 Tax planners soon created hybrid instruments not falling
in either category, posing the standard conceptual dilemma illustrated
by bootstrap "sales."
(2) Then the cases emphasized the ratio between the face amount
of the "debt" instrument and the fair market value of the "equity"
assets.' 28  Even if a ratio test were workable, 29 the decisions reveal no
range of ratios that bears any factual relationship to the problem.
Ratios of many thousands to one have been accepted in some of the
bootstrap cases. 130 Other cases have been approved where there was
Internal Revenue Code Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th
Cong., Ist Sess. 473 (1959); ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER C OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1954, REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTRBUTImNS AND ADJUSTMENTS
(1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 ADVISORY GROUP REPORT], in Hearings on a General
Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2491 (1958); Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Cur-
rent Questions, 34 TAXES 830 (1956); Hellerstein, Tax Court Approach to Thin
Capitalization Defended, 10 J. TAXATION 88 (1959); Manly, Election Under Sub-
chapter S Can Eliminate Thin-Incorporation Problem, 9 J. TAXATION 322 (1958);
Schlesinger, "Thin" Incorporations: Income Tax Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARV.
L. REv. 50 (1947); Semmel, Tax Consequences of Inadequate Capitalization, 48
CoLum. L. REv. 202 (1948); Comment, Mills Group Stands on Thin Incorporation,
Gifts of 306 Stock, Despite Bar's Protests, 10 J. TAXATION 139 (1959); Comment,
The Thin Incorporation Problem: Are the Courts Fighting the Tar Baby?, 5
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 275 (1958); Note, Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance, 55
CoLum. L. REv. 1054 (1955). This is a sharply abbreviated list
127United States v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1943);
Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1942);
John Kelley Co., 1 T.C. 457 (1943), rev'd, 146 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 326
U.S. 521 (1946). See Schlesinger, supra note 126; Semmel, upra note 126.
128 This presents a number of problems as to exactly how "debt' and "equity"
are to be measured in order to determine this ratio. See Bittker, supra note 126.
Observe also the controversy between the majority and the dissenting opinions in
Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956), as to exactly what the
ratio was in that particular case.
129 See the analysis of the pros and cons of any ratio test in the 1958 ALI STUDY
400-29. On the other hand, the 1958 ALI STUDY concluded (at 435-37) that the
arguments favored adoption of some type of a ratio test, perhaps one in the range
of 3Y, 4 or 5 to 1.
130 Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 899 (Ct. Cl.
1956) ; Estate of Howes, 30 T.C. 909 (1958), aff'd sub noma. Commissioner v. Johnson,
267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959) ; W. H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433 (1957), order amended,
17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 110 (1958); Ohio Furnace Co., 25 T.C. 179 (1955) (goet
appeal withdra n). Only in the Kolkey case was any emphasis laid upon a high
ratio of thin capitalization, and the thin capitalization in Kolkey was not as great
as in most of the other bootstrap cases.
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no equity capital at all.131 On the other hand, courts have at times
found an "equity" relationship where the ratio was as low as 8 to 1,"32
6 to 1,113 or even 1 to 1.134
(3) Some courts emphasize "intention" as a criterion .1 5  But a
shareholder's mere intention to be a "creditor" does not make him
one,"' although the shareholder's operative acts may be revealing as
to the relationship. Thus a debt without capital to stand behind it
is not debt whether or not the shareholder intends to levy on the cor-
poration if necessary. However, the fact that the shareholder does
not levy where the corporation is in default indicates an ownership
relationship. A creditor would ordinarily foreclose. But to "examine
the instrument" to determine "intention" is to seek a common-law form
of the will-o'-the-wisp.'
3 7
(4) Some cases frankly give free rein to tax "planning" as long
as it conforms to the most perfunctory type of formality. The Fifth
Circuit in Rowan v. Commissioner,3 ' and in Sun Properties, Inc. v.
Commissioner,3 9 rejected the thin capitalization doctrine entirely, talk-
ing vaguely of "intention," and emphasizing the right to "minimize"
taxes. In Sun Properties, a sole shareholder invested $400 in the stock
of his own corporation and then "sold" a warehouse to the corporation
for an alleged $125,000, which was held to be a debt, although no note
or other security instrument was issued to indicate that any transaction
had even occurred. This embodies many of the basic objections to the
bootstrap device (though the transaction did not, in addition, exploit
charitable exemptions or operating losses as do the bootstraps here con-
131 M. Greenhouse, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 849 (1954) ; R. L. Osborne, 13 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 428 (1954).
132J. A. Maurer, Inc., 30 T.C. 1273 (1958); Shaker Lee Theater, 14 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 452 (1955).
133 E. A. Matthessen v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1952).
1 3 4 Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
135 Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United States, 240 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Miller's
Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); Wilshire & Western Sand-
wiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949); Toledo Blade Co., 11
T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1950); Bakhaus & Burke, Inc., 14
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 919 (1955); J. B. Reilly, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 22 (1955).
13 6 For similar reasons, the abortive effort of the Supreme Court in Palmer v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937), to determine by what was "intended" whether or
not a particular corporate distribution was a dividend, fell by the wayside. It has
not been followed on this point by other decisions and it is clear that determinations
as to what is a dividend do not rest on intention.
'37E.g., First Mortgage Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1943);
Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1942).
138 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
139 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
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sidered).14° Like most emphasis on mere form, the decision resulted
in extensive tax "relief." Similarly, in Kraft Foods Co. v. Commis-
sioner," the Second Circuit held that the instrument looked like a debt
instrument, that the court could not disregard the intent and acts of the
parties and that any "legitimate" corporate-shareholder arrangements
must be respected. And in Miller's Estate v. Commissioner,'42 the
Ninth Circuit stated that it knew of no rule that let the Commissioner
dictate how much equity financing a corporation should have.
Such court of appeals holdings reversed Tax Court decisions
which had made a significant effort to apply the doctrine of substance
over form in analyzing the thin capitalization problem. 4 The Tax
Court, in Kraft Foods (and in Gooding Amusement, the only decision
in this vein affirmed by a court of appeals) 144 emphasized the absence of
a business purpose and the presence of tax avoidance purpose, the dis-
proportionate debt-equity ratio and the lack of the parties' intention
ever to enforce payment. The failure to enforce default provisions, is a
sign of ownership emphasized in Kolkey, although by-passed in Howes'
Estate and Truschel. It is not unusual where shareholders of a closely
held company hold its debt.' 45  And in Miller's Estate,146 the Tax
Court held that if "debt" was issued for assets vital to the business,
14 7
it revealed an intention that the assets should remain indefinitely "at
140 This Article has emphasized a complex form of bootstrap transactions which
include among their variables the use of tax-free funds such as is provided by a tax
exemption or a loss carry-over. Sun Properties and Rowan illustrate some of the
objections to even the simplest form of bootstrap sales-to-oneself in the sense of a
sale financed only by the earnings of the very asset transferred. Whatever the
difficulties of analysis presented by a transaction where stock is sold to be paid for
only out of dividends, etc., (however, see Grayck, Taxing Income That Is Applied
Against the Purchase Price, 12 TAX L. REv. 381 (1957)) such situations do not
involve the combination of variables presented by the bootstrap transaction. If the
more complex bootstrap devices were rejected by the courts, then there would be
grounds for questioning these simpler, commercially more usual, forms of the device.
141232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956), reversing 21 T.C. 513 (1954).
142239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
143 Miller's Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); Gooding
Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 1031 (1957); Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 513 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 118
(2d Cir. 1956) ; Benjamin D. Gilbert, 15 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 688 (1956), rev'd and
remanded, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957), decision on remand, 17 CCI- Tax Ct. Mem.
29 (1958), aff'd, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959). See Hellerstein, supra note 126.
144 Gooding Amusement Co., spra note 143.
145 The thin capitalization doctrine is virtually never applied to publicly held
companies, Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Corporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST.
ON FED. TAX 771 (1959). Thus, under the Tax Court approach, the "thin capitaliza-
tion" doctrine would be almost academic as very few notes or bonds of close corpo-
rations would be held to be debt instruments in their shareholders' hands.
146 Estate of Herbert 3. Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 729 (9th
Cir. 1956).
147 Bittker, supra note 126, suggests that the emphasis in Miller's Estate on
whether the notes were issued for permanent assets seems unsound.
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the risk of the business" 148 as part of its permanent capital and that
the debt, accordingly, should be treated as stock.
(5) An alternative general approach is to view any debt in the
hands of a shareholder of a close corporation as the equivalent of stock.
The trend of the Tax Court cases discussed above may amount to
this.'49 Indeed, it is difficult to discover a real justification for dis-
tinguishing between debt and equity for shareholders of a closed
corporation.'-" The shareholders control all close corporate distribu-
tions. They do not care what label is put on a tax transaction, but are
concerned only with its practical tax consequences. Thus the transac-
tions of the close corporation are often manipulated for tax advantage,
as many of the areas analyzed reveal. The artificial corporate entity
has economic reality largely in the case of publicly held companies. It
seems improbable that any realistic solution of the thin capitalization
problem will be reached without first drawing some distinction between
the public and the closely held corporations.
However, the Senate Finance Committee rejected the 1954 effort
to distinguish between public and close companies for a number of tax
purposes... Such an effort is even less likely to be successful now,
particularly in the thin capitalization area, in view of such developments
as subchapter S of the 1954 Code.8 2 If shareholders elect under sub-
chapter S not to be taxed as a corporation, that will automatically
eliminate for them most of the tax differences between debt and
equity.
153
148 There is some disagreement or misunderstanding over the term "risks of the
business." It has been suggested that it is a useless standard since any creditor
risks not being repaid if the business fails, and looks to its assets for his security.
But in this context, the reference is to the entrepreneurial risk that the business will
or will not make a profit, not the creditor's risk that the business will fail and be
unable to meet its debts. At its most evident, the difference is between an agreement
by General Motors to pay $1,000 at 39 in six months, or to pay 1% of its profits
for the next six months.
149 Caplin, supra note 145, at 806-07, contends that the Tax Court position is
inconsistent and contradictory.
180 See also 1958 ALI STUDY which raises serious doubts as to whether the
shareholder-creditor distinction is real for debt versus equity purposes. 1958 ALI
STUDY 58-59, 409; see id. 398-437, for a detailed discussion of the legislative proposals
of the ALI Staff and of the Subchapter C Advisory Group with respect to the
debt-equity problem. In addition, the ALI study contains an elaborate analysis of
many of the "technical" approaches to the problems of thin incorporation. Reading
between the lines of the study, it may suggest detailed criteria for distinguishing
debt from equity (of a closely held company) only as a necessary alternative to
more realistic solutions such as not recognizing shareholder-debt or enacting detailed
administrative regulations similar to those promulgated pursuant to Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
151 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954).
152 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-76.
153 See Manly, spra note 126; Meyer, Subchapter S Corporations, 36 TAxEs
919 (1958) ; Corporate Organization and Distributions, 10 J. TAXATION 130 (1959) ;
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The Thin Capitalization Doctrine and the Bootstrap Cases
All but one of the original bootstrap decisions avoided applica-
tion of the thin capitalization cases on the argument that Owners were
not literally shareholders of Feeder.'5" Only in Kolkey did the Tax
Court extend the doctrine to cover debt obligations in the hands of
such former owners.'5 5
Yet, so formal a distinction as whether a shareholder in form or a
shareholder in substance held the instruments should not have dissuaded
the court from applying the thin capitalization doctrine to the bootstrap
cases. The Tax Court had made a vigorous scrutiny of the economic
realities in other thin capitalization cases. The additional elements of
retention of control, exploitation of a charitable exemption, and the
Kolkey precedent, should have strengthened its position.
Formalism in the Thin Capitalization Decisions
As in the patent area, emphasis has been placed on the label. Deci-
sions have turned on formal phrases such as "license" or "assignment,"
"stock" or "bond," "debt" or "equity," instead of stressing the char-
acter of the entire relationship. In both areas the Commissioner and
a few courts made an attempt to apply the principle that if a taxpayer
wants the tax advantages of a shift of ownership, he can not retain
important items of ownership such as the entrepreneurial risk-a prin-
ciple set forth by the Supreme Court not only in the natural resources
field, but in the John Kelley case.'5 But the effort proved abortive with
patents and is likely to meet with little more success in thin capitaliza-
tion. The most apparent explanation for these developments lies in the
patterns of judicial formalism. 5" To this must be added the related
Note, Optional Taxation of Closed Corporations Under the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958, 72 HARv. L. REv. 710 (1959). However see Moore & Sorlien, Ad-
venture in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 14 TAx L. REv. 453, 472-73 (1959), which
points out that subchapter S's complexities do not make it an easy solution to the
thin capitalization difficulty.
154 They refused to recognize either that the retained risk left Owners still
owners, or that the notes or bonds should be treated as stock.
1,5 Kolkey extended the doctrine to thinly capitalized "debt" obligations where
the holders of the obligations did retain significant control with respect to the corpo-
ration but did not do so as shareholders. These factors seem sufficient to overcome
the resort to LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940), and its statement that the
mere owner of "bonds" (or "notes") can not have a "proprietary" interest. LeTidle
was a loosely worded effort to find that a particular transaction was not, in substance,
a reorganization. The bootstraps present a different problem and a different combina-
tion of circumstances. In Truschel and Howes' Estate, the "bonds" even had voting
rights. For those cases to rely on LeTulle was almost as inappropriate as Howes'
Estate's invoking the doctrine of substance over form.
156 John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
157 Hellerstein, supra note 126, characterizes the thin capitalization decisions as
illustrative of the current trend toward formalism.
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judicial inclination to feel sympathy for the individual taxpayer, for-
getting the effect that many individual grants of tax "relief" must have
upon the equity of the entire taxing system.
Nor do the legislative proposals of the American Law Institute 5
and of the Subchapter C Advisory Group "' promise a solution. Both
list fixed criteria for distinguishing between debt and equity, reminiscent
of the old standards as to stock or bond. In addition, the Advisory
Group recommends that the ratio not exceed 5 to 1, and the ALI would
now make it 3Y, 4 or 5 to 1, although in its 1954 draft of the Code,
the ALI rejected any ratio requirement. 60 These standards might be
adequate for a public corporation (for whom they are probably un-
necessary), but, as the ALI discussion itself indicates, the problems are
considerably more difficult in the case of the one-man corporation (and
other closed corporations)."' The proposed detailed standards would
make it even easier to avoid application of the thin capitalization
doctrine.112
The Reorganization Approach to the Bootstrap Cases
A corollary of the thin capitalization argument is to treat the
notes or bonds as "stock" and the transaction as a "reorganization,"
with Owners receiving "stock" in Feeder in place of their stock in the
old business. But even if the "reorganization" concept is viewed as
realistic rather than as just one more route to tax reduction, it does not
accurately describe a bootstrap transfer.
Assume that a reorganization is a transaction representing a
formal rather than an economic change in a business entity, and that it
requires an essential continuity of ownership and the absence of any
such event as will invoke the income tax doctrine of "realization." A
bootstrap still does not fit any more neatly within the "reorganization"
label than the "sale" label, and for similar reasons. Initially a boot-
strap transfer has continuity of ownership, and the business undergoes
little more than a formal change of ownership. But eventually there
will be a true change of ownership and a full economic transfer-over of
the business. Furthermore, the objectives of the bootstrap technique-
its efforts to continue getting the income of the business at capital gains
rates and to manipulate the tax exemption-are not consonant with the
158 See note 150 supra.
159 See authorities cited note 126 stpra.
160 See 1958 ALI STUDY 398-99, 436.
161 Id. at 401-02.
162The tax section of the Chicago Bar Association has described the detailed
criteria set forth by the Subchapter C Advisory Group as a "blueprint for avoidance."
The tax section suggests it might be better to have no more amendments to sub-
chapter C in view of its present "unworkable level of complexity," see Comment, 10
J. TAXATIoN 139, 140 (1959). And see 1958 ALI STUDY 398.
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proclaimed purposes of the reorganization privilege. To call a bootstrap
a reorganization, concedes a "business purpose" which a bootstrap lacks.
The unsuitability of the reorganization label is revealed in other
ways, too. If the transaction is a reorganization, then the downpay-
ment is "boot." And a court that would be content with a reorganiza-
tion description of a bootstrap transfer might also conclude that the
"boot" was "capital gain boot" rather than "dividend boot." 10 The
inappropriateness of such a treatment has been suggested by analysis
of the retention of risk and will be further emphasized below."0 4
Furthermore, a reorganization approach, from a practical per-
spective, compels the proof of a long series of steps, some relatively
unrealistic. First you must prove that the notes are "stock," that the
downpayment is "boot" and that the boot is "dividend boot." Then
you would have to demonstrate that any payments on the "notes" are
"redemptions equivalent to a dividend." You would also have to show
that any earnings and profits of the old business were transferred intact
to the new entity. Any break in this chain would be fatal. Certainly
it makes more sense to approach the transaction in terms of its realities
than to run so elaborate a gauntlet. Indeed one factor that handicapped
the Commissioner in handling the original bootstraps was a continued
emphasis on a reorganization approach. And, of course, the reorgan-
ization approach, like the thin capitalization doctrine, offers no solution
for the lease-type bootstrap, which lacks notes to be characterized as
stock.' 5
Retention of Control
The General Doctrine
The principle that retention of control is a sign of ownership is
another doctrine which has been boldly proclaimed, but weakly enforced.
The classic authority on the effect of retained control is Helvering v.
Clifford.' There a traditional common-law trust for the benefit of
settlor's wife was refused tax recognition. This determination was
based on the broad control kept by the settlor, the short term of the
trust and its intra-family nature. The Court emphasized that the
arrangement must be considered as a whole and held that in substance
settlor had retained so many of the incidents of ownership that the trust
income was taxable to him.
17
36
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356.
164 See text accompanying notes 297-317 infra.
165 See note 122 supra.
166309 U.S. 331 (1940).
'67Int Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(a), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 9 (now INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 61(a)).
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Many cases follow Clifford in principle by emphasizing retained
control as the essence of an arrangement.""8 The Supreme Court stated
in Commissioner v. Sunnen: 169
"The crucial question remains whether the assignor retains suffi-
cient power and control over the assigned property or over receipt
of the income to make it reasonable to treat him as recipient of
the income for tax purposes. As was said in Corliss v. Bowers,
281 U.S. 376, 378, 'taxation is not so much concerned with the
refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property
taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid.'"
And the Court emphasized: "There is absent any indication that the
transfer of the contract effected any substantial change in the taxpayer's
economic status." 170
The discrepancy between these proclaimed principles and the actual
operation of the taxing process is a further source of substantial "ero-
sion" of our progressive income tax system. The judicial history of
the 1939 Code's section 45 ... illustrates once again the basic role
played in these developments by formal ways of judicial thought.
The Judicial Acceptance of Section 45
The bootstrap cases raise the question of how much recognition is
to be given a transfer when the old owners retain control and other
aspects of ownership. Section 45 172 poses a comparable issue. If
income, deductions or credits are shifted or if an entire business is split
among entities under a common control or ownership, to whom are
the items to be attributed for tax purposes-the formal transferee or the
transferor ?
The language of section 45 is broad and flexible. It gives the
Commissioner a wide discretion to allocate items among entities under
16 8 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
355 (1939) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) ; White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d
398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); W. H. Armston Co. v.
Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,
79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935); Estate of J. G. Dodson,
1 T.C. 416 (1943); Paul Plunkett Co., 42 B.T.. 464 (1940).
169 333 U.S. 591, 604-05 (1948).
.1701d. at 607-09.
171 Ch. '1, 53 Stat. 25 (now IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 482). For convenience,"section 45" will be taken to refer to either. See Lanning, Some Realities of Tax
Reform, in 1959-1 TAx RE isIoN COMPENDIUM 19, for a discussion of the general
impact on erosion of the income tax of the failure to give operative effect to pro-
gressive income tax principles in areas such as the 1939 Code's § 45.
172 Section 45 reads: "In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United
States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests, the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate
gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allo-
cation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income
of any of such organizations, trades or businesses."
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common ownership or control so as to reflect economic realities."'
Such a statute 174 would seem to leave little opening for the judicial
conceptualism found in areas such as patent transfers. But history
has demonstrated otherwise. The cases under section 45 have fre-
quently put more emphasis on the formal validity of transactions among
controlled entities or between the entities and their owners than on the
underlying relationships.
Application of section 45 is denied if the transaction has a "busi-
ness purpose." 175 Corporations A and B, both solely owned by X, may
have a business purpose for shifting certain items between themselves.
The policy problem is whether tax recognition is warranted for a trans-
action with so little net economic effect. The fact that a tax advantage
can be achieved without more than a formal transfer also poses the issue
as to how far one should question the business purpose claimed. But
Miles-Conley Co.' 6 holds that it is not even necessary for there to be a
"business purpose" if the business operations are conducted by independ-
ent, separate entities, or if the transaction is not "sham."
This argument that because the transferee is a "real," independent
entity the transfer, also, must be "real" is frequently made. But it
obscures the problem. If it were sufficient that the transferee were a
real entity, most of the items covered by section 45 could be shifted at
will. In General Indus. Corp.,7 for example, corporations A and B
were both owned by a husband and wife. A sold securities which had
cost it $100,000 to B at their fair market value of $25,000. The Com-
missioner's powers under section 45 were held not to extend to disallow-
'73 H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1928), and S. REP. No. 960,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1928), state the purpose of the section (§ 45): "the
Commissioner may, in the case of two or more trades or businesses owned or con-
trolled by the same interests, apportion, allocate or distribute the income or deductions
between or among them, as may be necessary in order to prevent evasion (by the
shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted
for the purpose of 'milking'), and in order clearly to reflect their true tax liability."
174 Among the articles dealing with § 45 are Baird, Commissioner's Power to Re-
allocate Income, U. So. CAL. 1948 TAX IiqST. 399; Buschmann, The Court Holding
Company Situation and Section 45, 29 TAXES 363 (1951); Ekman, Warning Signals
Under Sections 45 and 129, N.Y.U. 12T. INST. ON FED. TAX 693 (1954) ; Holzman,
Arm's-Length Transactions and Section 45, 25 TAXES 389 (1947) ; McCaffrey, Divid-
ing a Business, 30 TAXES 855 (1952) ; Mintz, Recent Developments in Allowance of
Loss on Sales Between Controlled Companies, N.Y.U. 8TH INsT. o N FED. TAX 29
(1950); Sherman, A Case History of Section 45, 29 TAXES 13 (1951); Swartz,
Transactions Between Related Corporations, 26 TAXES 941 (1948).
175 Commissioner v. Chelsea Prods., Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); T.V.D.
Co., 27 T.C. 879 (1957); Palm Beach Aero Corp., 17 T.C. 1169 (1952); Buffalo
Meter Co., 10 T.C. 83 (1948); Standard Fruit Produce, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 733
(1949) ; Brost Motors, Inc., 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 806 (1948) ; John Wachtel Corp.,
4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 768 (1945); but see O'Neill v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 596
(2d Cir. 1948) ; Alpha Tank & Sheet Metal Mfg. Co. v. United States, 116 F. Supp.
721 (Ct. Cl. 1953) ; Louis Adler Realty Co., 6 T.C. 778 (1946).
176 10 T.C. 754 (1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1949).
17735 B.T.A. 615 (1937), acq., 1937-1 Cum. BuLL. 10.
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ing the loss, although this would seem to be a classic case for invoking
the section. Even though the controlled corporations, A and B were
"real" in the sense of not being a transparent legal sham, it was un-
realistic to see the economic group (husband, wife and the two cor-
porations) as having realized a $75,000 loss at this point, when control
and ownership of the securities had been retained.
This poses the issue of the basic judicial approach. Is it sufficient
to satisfy section 45 if the transaction is formally permissible-if there
is a real entity, a business purpose to the transaction, or if it is not sham
or non-bona fide? If so, the limitations on the shifting of income and
other tax items whose manipulation is covered by section 45 will be
confined to the more transparent cases of semi-fraud, where the tax-
payer's error may lie in lacking tax counsel to provide a formal gloss.
Or will the entire relationship between the parties-the economic reali-
ties-be decisive? That is, is the principle that income shall be taxed
to the person who earned it 17 8 to be taken seriously?
A number of decisions under section 45 accept the form of the
transaction unless the Commissioner can prove sham .17  This argu-
ment was used to justify approval of most of the bootstrap transac-
tions. 80 The presence of sham, or fraud, or even innuendoes of non-
bona fides, makes it easier to pierce the form of a transaction. But
the form of the transaction may not describe what is actually occurring,
even though sham elements are not present or can not be proved.
The stock option cases illustrate that. The issuance of most stock
options to executives or shareholders is anything but a sham transac-
tion. But to call a stock option "property," and so a capital asset, or
"proprietary" rather than "compensatory" falls far short of describing
its real substance."" And there have been many Supreme Court cases
in which a substance over form analysis was applied, although the
actual transaction was binding on the parties and was not in any literal
sense a sham.'
8 2
178 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
179John L. Denning & Co. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1950);
Polak's Frutal Works, Inc., 21 T.C. 953 (1954), acq., 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 6; Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 19 T.C. 259 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum. Buu.. 6; Buffalo Meter
Co., 10 T.C. 83 (1948) ; Koppers Co., 2 T.C. 152 (1943), acq., 1948-1 Cum. Buu.. 1.
General Indus. Corp., 35 B.T.A. 615 (1937), acq., 1937-1 Cum. Burr. 10. See
Swartz, supra note 174, at 941; but see Crown Cork Intl Corp., 4 T.C. 19 (1944),
aff'd, 149 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1945) ; see note 195 infra.
180 See authorities cited note 130 supra.
181 Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324
U.S. 177 (1945). See note 20 supra. This is discussed in Lanning, Some Realities of
Tax Reform, supra note 171.
182 E.g., Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957); Commissioner v.
Phipps, 336 U.S. 410 (1949); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Com-
missioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
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As a practical matter, a "sham" requirement usually amounts to
a decision that form shall prevail. This is due in part to the difficulty
of persuading the courts to be so inquiring as to find non-bona fides.
For example, in Caldwell v. Campbell, the Fifth Circuit sharply criticized
the Commissioner for presuming to suggest that the taxpayer was using
the exempt status of his controlled charitable foundation and the capital
gains and installment sales provisions for his personal profit. The
court held that the transaction was in good faith despite the district
court's finding to the contrary, and concluded that it did not matter how
much the taxpayer minimized his taxes, "if only it is clear that the
transaction was real and not a sham, that is if it was what it purported
to be, a real and effective transfer of title from the taxpayer to
another." 183
A similar philosophy is behind the "reality" major argument, an
argument which would reject use of section 45 on the ground that the
particular corporation was a "real corporate entity." 184 Estate of J. I.
Byrne,'s5 carries this entity argument to a reductio ad absurdum by
stating that it would decline to ignore the entity of an individual. A
corporation (or individual) can be a real entity and yet be utilized to
receive another corporation's income. If a corporate entity is so unreal
that it can be completely disregarded, or if there is a complete sham,
the courts would probably refuse to recognize the transaction even if
section 45 or the general substance-over-form doctrine were not avail-
able. Section 45 and substance over form are both aimed at those
situations where sham can not be demonstrated, but where the form of
the transaction is quite different than the fact.
Among the other judicial doctrines for limiting section 45
wherever there is at least formal validity to the transaction are (1) that
the terms are those that parties at "arm's length" would have arrived
at,186 (2) that the corporation has a "business activity," 187 and (3)
183218 F.2d 567, 573.
1
84 In National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949), the Com-
missioner's effort to apply principles similar to § 45 on broad substance over form
grounds was rejected by the Supreme Court on arguments stressing the validity of
the corporate entity, that the transaction was not "sham," etc. See also Miles-Conley
Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 754 (1948), aff'd, 173 F2d 958 (4th Cir. 1948) ; General
Indus. Corp., 35 B.T.A. 615 (1937), acq., 1937-1 Cum. BuLL. 10; but see National
Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); Gordon Can Co., 29 B.T.A.
272 (1933); J. P. Wagner, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 569 (1958).
185 16 T.C. 1234 (1951).
186 Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 19 T.C. 259 (1952), acq., 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 6;
Koppers Co., 2 T.C. 152 (1943), acq., 1943 Cum. BuLL. 14; Welworth Realty Co.,
40 B.T.A. 97 (1939), acq., 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 39 (based on the finding of a fair
rental price); Fair Price Stations, Inc., 5 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 401 (1946). See
Baird, mtpra note 174, at 406.
187 National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 52 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd and
remanded, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944).
TAX EROSION AND THE BOOTSTRAP SALE
that it is permissible for taxpayers to "minimize" their taxes.18 We
have already seen that this last argument is usually but another way
to emphasize form.
Some of the arguments used to deny the application of section 45
seem to go even further and to be based on little more than verbalisms.
It has been held that the statutory language does not extend to actually
"denying" a deduction; 189 that the Commissioner can not allocate
income if that would be the "creation" of income; 190 that the apportion-
ment or allocation of income, deductions or credits is permissible, but
not the "combining" or "consolidating" of income; '' that the neces-
sary statutory "control" is lacking where a husband and wife have the
necessary percentage of ownership for control, but it is divided between
them 192 and that "gross" profits but not "net" profits can be allocated. 93
Despite such decisions, section 45 did not meet the complete frus-
tration accorded provisions such as section 129 of the 1939 Code.
9 4
The Commissioner was upheld on a number of occasions in the ap-
plication of section 45.195 But the treatment of that section, on the
whole, presents a problem which it is easy to oversimplify. It arises on
two levels. The first is the difficulty of assuring that there is no arti-
ficial shifting of income or other tax items among controlled entities-
briefly, that income is taxed to the person who earned it. It is on this
level that the many decisions which stress formalities rather than the
claimed objectives of the statute have been criticized.
188 This is an argument that frequently accompanies the requirement of a showing
of "sham." See cases cited note 179 supra.
189 General Indus. Corp., 35 B.T.A. 615 (1937), acq., 1937-1 CuM. BuLL. 10.
See Mintz, supra note 174. But the case of Hearst Corp., 14 T.C. 575 (1950), acq.,
1950-2 CuM. BULL 2, did permit the "disallowance" of an item under § 45-mostly
to the taxpayer's advantage.
190 Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co., B.T.A. Memo. Dec. 10, 073-D, June 30, 1938,
rev'd and remanded, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940).
191 Chelsea Prods. v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); Palm Beach
,Aero Corp., 17 T.C. 1169 (1952) ; Estate of J. I. Byrne, 16 T.C. 1234 (1951) ; Cedar
Valley Distillery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870 (1951), acq., 1951-2 CuM. BuLL. 2; Seminole
Flavor Co., 4 T.C. 1215 (1945), acq., 1945 CuM. BuLL. 6. See McCaffrey, supra
note 174, at 862.
192 A. G. Nelson Paper Co., 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 914 (1944).
193 T.V.D. Co., 20 T.C. 879 (1957).
194Added by ch. 63, § 128(a), 58 Stat. 47 (1944) (now INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954,
§ 269). See discussion of this section in Part II.
195 Peacock v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Dillard-Waltermire,
Inc. v. Campbell, 255 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1958); Grenada Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner,
202 F.Zd 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953) ; Central Cuba Sugar Co.
v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952); Advance
Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
835 (1952); Hugh Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 224 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 918 (1949); National Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.
1943) ; Birmingham Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Davis, 112 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1940) ;
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 645 (1935); Pennsylvania Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.),
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But there is a more fundamental difficulty which suggests that the
basic principle behind section 45 (and such related sections as sections
15 (c) and 129 of the 1939 Code) is not itself fully consistent with this
same general principle that income should be taxed-and at pro-
gressively increasing rates-to the person who earned it. The difficulty
lies in the assumption behind all of these statutes that a closely held
corporate entity has substantial economic reality. The public corpora-
tion usually is an independent economic unit. But the close company
is the mere alter ego of its owners. To apply section 45 because the
transaction is "at arm's length" or has a "business purpose" may dis-
regard the close corporate entity and amount to compulsory consolida-
tion, but it is more realistic than to give a loss deduction where there
is no essential transfer of ownership.
Given this analysis, it is seen that the uncertainty of the section
45 decisions reflects their effort to define the acceptable degree of reality
for transactions that are ultimately unreal. The definitive answer to the
problems of section 45 (and many of the other corporate tax provi-
sions) may be to limit the advantages of the corporate form to the
publicly held company. But the statutory trend is hardly in that
direction.
Sales and Leasebacks
"Sales and leasebacks" present similar questions of retention of
control. A sale and leaseback often involves the sale of land and build-
ings or fixed assets used in the trade or business of the owner to a
buyer who simultaneously leases the property back to owner.'9 6 The
length of the lease, which often has renewal options, frequently exceeds
the usual life of the asset conveyed. The leases are often "net leases,"
Owner assuming various of the duties and burdens of ownership such
as operation, maintenance, insurance and taxes. There is a formal
transfer of such indicia of ownership as legal title. However, Owner
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 588 (1935) ; Gordon Can Co., 29 B.T.A. 272 (1933). A number
of these cases either derive from an earlier period where more emphasis was placed
on substance-over-form principles, or involve fact situations extreme enough so that
a "sham" analysis is truly relevant.
196 Among the many articles are Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale
and Lease-back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1948) ; Cary, Current Problems in Sale, or Gift and Leaseback Transactions,
29 TAxEs 662 (1951); Cary, Tax Aspects of Sale and Lease-Back of Corporate
Property, N.Y.U. 7TH INST. ON FED. TAX 599 (1949); Casey, How To Determine
Best Form for Real Estate Syndicate To Preserve Tax Advantages, 7 J. TAXATION
328 (1957) ; Friedman & Silbert, The Form of the Entity and Its Capital Structure
in Real Estate Acquisitions, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX 609 (1958) ; Lassers,
Does a Leaseback Save You Money?, 32 TAxEs 279 (1954) ; Spandorf, Real Estate
Syndicates: How To Organize, Operate and Sell Them for Tax Advantage, 6 J.
TAXATION 44 (1957) ; Note, Taxation of Sale and Lease-back Transactions, 60 YALE
L.J. 879 (1951) ; 65 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1952).
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retains enough of the substantial aspects of ownership, such as posses-
sion and control, so that the issue is posed whether there has been a
transfer of ownership sufficient to warrant tax recognition.
Sales and leasebacks may be (1) transactions with a "related
party" such as a relative or a controlled legal entity, or (2) "commer-
cial" transactions with an independent third party.197 The related-
party sales and leasebacks involve questions of retention of ownership,
and substance over form, similar to those of the bootstraps. It is these
leasebacks that will principally be considered. 9
White v. Fitzpatrick 199 is a typical "related" sale and leaseback.
There the sole owner of a manufacturing corporation sold to and
leased back from his wife both the patents and the land used for manu-
facturing, filing a gift tax return. The Commissioner disallowed both
rental and royalty deductions. The court of appeals upheld this ruling,
stating that although the wife had legal title, husband had retained as
much control as if there had been no transfer, and pointing out that
husband could not have run the business without the patents or the
land.
One might expect that-consistent with the tax principles stated
by Clifford,20 Higgins,201 Griffiths,202 and other cases 203 the original
owner in a leaseback transaction would be seen as having retained so
much control and as having changed his economic position so little, that
he would still be treated as the owner for tax purposes. There was a
period when this view prevailed and the decisions analyzed leasebacks
in terms of the economic realities."' Such decisions emphasized that
the transferor retained actual control of the property involved, and
held that the rents or royalties under the lease were not deductible.205
197 Most of the commentaries cited note 196 supra deal with such "commercial"
sales and leasebacks. These commercial sales and leasebacks include Helvering v.
F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939); Jordon Marsh Co. v. Commissioner,
269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959) ; May Dep't Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951), acq., 1951-2
Cum. ButL. 3; Century Elec. Co., 15 T.C. 581 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952); Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 T.C. 41
(1950), acq., 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 4.
198 But even the "commercial" sales and leasebacks are not without relevance.
They should probably be tested primarily by whether the leaseback covers the useful
life of the asset-i.e., has anything of economic significance been transferred?
199 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952).
200 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
201 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
202 Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
203 See cases cited notes 72, 168 supra.
204 White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952); W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951); Ingle
Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Shaffer Terminals, Inc.,
16 T.C. 356 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952).
205 Accord, Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936) ; 58th St. Plaza
Theatre, Inc., 16 T.C. 469 (1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 820 (1952).
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But even during this period there were courts which emphasized
form alone-particularly the courts in Skemp v. Commissioner20  and
Brown v. Commissioner.°7 And starting in the 1950's a discernible
swing toward formalism and tax "relief" appears. 08 Typical is the
Felix case,2"9 in which a taxpayer and his wife transferred vital equip-
ment used in their coal stripping partnership to an irrevocable trust for
their children and then leased the equipment back. A major reason
given by the tax court for upholding the leaseback was that the trustee,
a bank paid five per cent for its services, was an "independent trus-
tee." 210 Inasmuch as the transaction is fully prearranged, it would
appear unimportant whether the trustee is a nominally independent
party, such as a bank.21' Yet even those decisions which refused to
recognize the sale and leaseback 21 did not expressly call Brown and
Skemp wrong, but distinguished them on the basis of this formal argu-
ment about an "independent trustee."
The leaseback cases granting tax relief employ the same formal
arguments we have seen in other contexts, for example, in the limitation
of section 45. Felix, Brown, and Stearns Magnetic all refer to the
bona fides 113 of the transaction. 14  Other arguments emphasize that
the rents were reasonable in amount,215 that the price was fair and
206 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
207 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
208 Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954);
Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), nonacq., 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 10.
209Albert T. Felix, supra note 208.
21OAccord, Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); Sal v.
Smith, 53-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9123 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
211 See Rev. Rul. 54-9, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 20.
212White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952); Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949); Shaffer
Terminals, Inc., 16 T.C. 356 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952).
The judicial technique involved in White v. Fitzpatrick's "distinguishing" Broznw
and Skemp as involving "independent trustees," rather than expressly rejecting those
decisions, may have contributed to the result in Felix. See note 94 supra for a
commentary on a similar situation. And the refusal of the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in Brown despite its apparent conflict with Ingle Coal Corp. also con-
tributed to the development of the doctrine.
213 Note Judge Raum's dissent in Felix, 21 T.C. at 807, emphasizing that the
leaseback deductions lack substance, irrespective of "bona fides."
214 This is an extraordinary argument on the facts of Stearns Magnetic Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954). There a corporation which was
owned by a father and son distributed a dividend in kind consisting of a patent vital
to the business, and then licensed it back for ten per cent of the gross sales, on a
renewable one-year nonexclusive license. The shareholders did not even report the
patent dividend as income, on the claim that it had only "speculative value" at the
time of the distribution. The transaction not merely lacked substance, but appears
to have been a real sham, and perhaps more, despite the remarkable argument of the
Seventh Circuit that the corporation had a "right" to declare a dividend and did so.
215Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), nonacq., 1956-2 Cux. BULL. 10.
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reasonable and in accordance with arm's-length standards, 216 and that
title had shifted.
217
VI. THE BOOTSTRAP USE OF CHARITIES AND
CHARITABLE EXEMPTIONS
Much of the discussion to this point might seem applicable to the
simpler type of bootstrap 218 where the purchase is paid for out of
earnings of the asset transferred without any use of tax exemptions or
other tax-free funds. In principle it is doubtful that such a transfer
qualifies as a capital gains sale. But there seems little point in
exploring this beyond the analysis already made of transfers of owner-
ship, for the courts have been reluctant to recognize the bootstrap
problem even when misuse of charitable exemptions or loss carryovers
is combined with retention of risk and control.
Bootstraps and the Objectives of the Exemption Provisions
The use of a charitable exemption has been a vital catalyst of the
bootstrap technique. Central to this was the charitable "feeder" and
its half brother, the "split-feeder." 219 The existence and uses of
charitable feeders are difficult to reconcile with the claimed objectives
of the exemption laws.
The basic language of section 101 (6), found in every revenue act
since the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909,22° lists as exempt from
taxation: "corporations, and any . . . foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or educational
purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual . ...
And in Better Business Bureau, Inc. v. United States,221 the
Supreme Court set out what seemed to be a basic doctrine: "[T]he
presence of a single noneducational purpose, if substantial in nature, will
destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly
educational purposes." 222 One would assume from this that for
216 Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954).
2 17 Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
218 See note 1 supra.
219 This last term aptly describes the "lease" technique used after the Revenue
Act of 1950 to split operating income off into one entity while retaining "passive"
"rental" income in another, by leasing the business to a separate entity and taking
back most of its income as "rent."
220 Ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11.
221326 U.S. 279 (1945).
222 326 U.S. 279, 283. Better Business Bureau concerned exemption from social
security taxes under § 811(b) (8) of the Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat 620,
639 (1935). H-owever, the relevant language of that section was the same as the
language of § 101(6), of the 1939 Code.
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charitable exemption an organization must be organized and operated
exclusively for public purposes, that its funds must be devoted exclu-
sively to such purposes and that for any private individual to use an
exemption or exempt organization to divert exempted funds to private
purposes would lead to loss of exemption. However, the doctrine and
the practice deviated widely enough to open the loophole that culminated
in the original bootstrap cases.
223
A major argument in support of the original bootstrap device is
that Feeder is entitled to charitable exemption because Feeder's income
is "destined" for Charity: But (1) does the tax-exempt operation of a
competitive business violate legislative policy? (2) do the payments to
Owner constitute "private inurement" rather than purchase price
payments?
Business Activity by Exempt Organizations
Charitable "Parents" and "Feeders"
Functionally, there are two general forms in which organizations
claiming section 101 (6) exemption seek to accomplish business, com-
mercial and other nonexempt purposes and functions: (1) the exempt
organization (a "parent" organization) personally conducts various
commercial activities, or (2) the basic charity uses a separate entity (a
"feeder") which operates profit-making economic activities and turns
over some or all of its income to the parent.2"
Some decisions which permit charities to engage in competitive
business may be explained by the failure to observe the differences
between parents and feeders. Where a parent charity engages in
223 A few of the articles that deal with the various problems of tax exemption
are: Tunks, The Modern Philanthropic Foundation and Private Property (1948)
(unpublished S.J.D. thesis in Yale Law Library); Alexander, The Use of Founda-
tions in Business, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX 591 (1957); Cutler, Various
Aspects of Contributions to Charities, N.Y.U. 17TH INsT. ON FED. TAX 1117 (1959) ;
Latcham, Private Charitable Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Implications, 98
U. PA. L. REv. 617 (1950); MacCracken, Selling a Business to a Charitable Founda-
tion, U. So. CAL. 1954 TAX INST. 205; Moore & Dohan, Sales, Churches and Monkey-
shines, 11 TAX L. Rav. 87 (1956); N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1-148 (1956)
(a series of articles dealing with charitable foundations) ; Note, Criticized Uses of
Federal Tax Exemption Privileges by Charitable Foundations and Educational In-
stitutions, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 696 (1950) ; Note, Taxation of Sale and Leaseback
Transactions, 60 YALE L.J. 879 (1951) ; Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Reve-
nue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851 (1951); Comment, The Modern Philanthropic
Foundation: A Critique and a Proposal, 59 YALE L.J. 477 (1950).
224 The term "parent" is here used to describe both a basic charity which conducts
some profit-making activities, and a charity which receives the funds earned by a
profit-making "feeder." Whether the feeder pays operating income over direct to
the parent, or leases the business from the parent and pays it the business income in
the form of rent does not appear to present any basic economic differences. Therefore
the term "feeder" is used to cover both situations.
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commercial activities, the issue is whether these activities are minor
enough, or closely enough related to the principal charitable purposes,
so as to be merely "incidental" activities. The primary activity of a
feeder, however, is commercial or profit making. Is the fact that the
feeder's income is "destined" to a basic charity sufficient to justify
charitable exemption?
The "Destination" Test
In the key case of Trinidad v. Sagrade Orden,225 a monastery
made certain sales of wines and chocolates within its own organization,
the profits being used for its own exempt purposes. On the facts, these
activities were merely "incidental" to this parent's primary-and exempt
-activities, but the Court also said in a dictum that the test of exemp-
tion is the "destination," not the source, of income. That latter doctrine,
which was not completely unsound in Trinidad (and in such similar
parent cases as Unity School 226) has been lifted out of context and
applied to substantial commercial activities by a parent,1 7 as well as to
the whole line of feeder cases.
The leading case of Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner,228 used
the Trinidad dictum to permit a going business which "fed" exempt
organizations to receive section 101 (6) immunity. The court would
not deny deduction to a feeder if the deduction would be permissible
where the exempt organization itself did the business activity.22 But
it is one thing for a parent-exempt organization whose primary activity
is charitable to perform profit-making activities related to its primary
purpose and relatively small in volume. This, perhaps, justifies exemp-
tion on facts such as those of Trinidad, Unity School, and Southeastern
Fair Ass'n v. United States.230 It is quite another thing for a feeder to
perform such commercial activities for profit as its primary (or sub-
stantial) function, even though some, or all, of the feeder's income
eventually goes to exempt purposes.23'
A good number of the destination test cases involve mere incidental
profit activities, somewhat like Trinidad.3 2 But even under the destina-
225263 U.S. 578 (1924).
226 Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926).
227 See, e.g., Sand Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927).
22896 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
229 Accord, Estate of Simpson, 2 T.C. 963 (1943).
230 52 F. Supp. 219 (Ct. Cl. 1943).
231 Yet the Commissioner acquiesced in Roche's Beach for a number of years,
not changing his position until 1942 in G.C.M. 23063, 1942-1 Cum. BULL. 103. By
then the pattern of the feeder device had started to emerge.
232 See Commissioner v. Battle Creek, Inc., 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942) ; South-
eastern Fair Ass'n v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 219 (Ct. Cl. 1943); Estate of
Simpson, 2 T.C. 963 (1943); Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926);
Salem Lutheran Home Ass'n, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 117 (1943).
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tion test the feeder must be actually feeding the parent, that is, income
must be going to exempt purposes in one sense or another.233 It would
be difficult to find that Feeder was "feeding" substantial funds to
Charity in the bootstrap cases since Feeder accumulates almost all the
income from the business and turns it over to Owner.
In any event, the relevance of Feeder's income being "destined"
for a charity, to the proclaimed principles in the area is doubtful. Were
Feeder's activities exclusively charitable? Can it be asserted that
Feeder was not competing unfairly with taxed businesses? Is the
revenue loss due to excluding Feeder's business from taxation accept-
able? These questions are difficult to answer affirmatively on the sole
grounds that Feeder turns its profits over to a charity.
Many feeder cases rely on Trinidad and Roche's Beach.25 4 But so
slender a reed necessarily had more covert support. Many organizations
both have exempt purposes and functions, and perform other activities
for profit, or of a commercial nature. As section 101 (6) was drafted,
however, the courts had either to declare an organization which had
many exempt functions not exempt at all or to hold it completely im-
mune from taxation, although many of its activities may have been
commercial operations for profit on a competitive basis. Understand-
ably, when confronted with this Hobson's choice-and particularly
where such cherished objectives of our culture as education, religion
and charity were proclaimed to be at stake--the courts were reluctant
to choose that horn of the dilemma which would have denied exemption
in toto. But if the courts had examined the facts, and not merely applied
the "destination" label, they might have inquired whether education or
charity or religion were actually being served in particular feeder
situations. This might have made any departure from basic principles
unnecessary in a number of these cases including the bootstraps. 23 5
23 See Bear Gulch Water Co. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 975 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 652 (1941). See also Fort Scott Clinic & Hosp. Corp. v. Brodrick,
99 F. Supp. 515 (D. Kan. 1951) ; Kriesien v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 873 (D. Ore.
1951) ; Medical Diagnostic Ass'n, 42 B.T.A. 610 (1940), in all of which there is a
serious question as to whether funds are actually being "fed" to exempt organizations.
But see Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1954).
234 C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Willingham
v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950); Com-
missioner v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949); Samuel Friedland Foundation v.
United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956); Sico Co. v. United States, 102 F.
Supp. 197 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
235 The problem was compounded by the failure of the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in destination test cases such as United States v. Community Servs., Inc.
189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952), even though there
was a considerable split of authority as to the validity of the destination test prior
to the 1950 legislation. Courts rejecting the destination test include Better Business
Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945) ; Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d
738 (8th Cir. 1951); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1952) ; John Danz, 18 T.C. 454 (1952), aff'd, 231
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The "Organized" Test
The Commissioner, too, has been guilty of formalism in the ap-
plication of the exemption statutes. The Commissioner has sought to
apply the so-called "organized" test, which makes exemption depend
on whether the wording of an organization's charter provides exclu-
sively for charitable purposes. 2'6 But it is ordinarily easy to amend
a charter. This test will serve mostly to penalize those who lack expert
tax counsel, while revealing very little about the organization's major
qualifications for exemption.
Nor are the various dogma of statutory interpretation of much
assistance. The cases which permit commercial activity by parents
or feeders, stress the public purposes of exempt organizations as justify-
ing a liberal interpretation of the statute.2 7  The cases which deny
exemption emphasize that the statute must be interpreted strictly since
exemptions are a matter of legislative grace.238  "Liberal" or "strict"
interpretations appear to be myths in their own right, rather than tools
of analysis.
239
F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 828 (1956); Donor Realty Corp.,
17 T.C. 899 (1951); Joseph B. Eastmen Corp., 16 T.C. 1502 (1951); Peggy Lou
Riker, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 903 (1955), aff'd, 244 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 839 (1957); Ralph H. Eaton Foundation, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 210
(1953), aff'd, 219 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1955). Courts continuing to support the destina-
tion test include Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957);
C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 234; Willingham v. Home Oil Mill,
supra note 234; Commissioner v. Orton, supra note 234; Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); Sico Co. v. United States, supra note 234;
Southeast Fair Ass'n v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 219 (Ct. Cl. 1943).
236 Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 160 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1947); Sun-Herald
Corp. v. Duggan, 73 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 719 (1935);
contra, Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 235; N.P.E.F. Corp., 5 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 313 (1946). See also Commissioner v. Battle Creek, Inc., 126 F.2d
405 (5th Cir. 1942); Sand Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927) (charter listed many
business powers). Nonetheless, in his recently adopted regulations, the Commissioner
has strongly reasserted this "organized" test, despite these objections and the authori-
ties to the contrary. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)- (1) (1959).
237See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 379 (1937); Commis-
sioner v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934). See also Union & New Haven Trust Co. v.
Eaton, 20 F.2d 419 (D. Conn. 1927), which states that there is an exception to the
strict construction rule where public policy dictates a more liberal attitude. Accord,
Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Roche's Beach, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68
F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945).
238White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1936); New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Commissioner, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d
451 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1952) ; Barnhart-Morrow Consol. v.
Commissioner, 150 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 38
(4th Cir. 1942) ; Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F.2d 552 (10th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 620 (1940). But see Griswold, An Argument
Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter
of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1142 (1943), which suggests that if Congress
did deny all deductions and thereby tax gross receipts-exercising the power which
in theory underlies the strict interpretation doctrine-it would be unconstitutional
as a tax on capital.
239 Contrast the district court decision in United States v. Community Servs.,
Inc., 50-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19506 (E.D.S.C. 1950), rev'd, 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951),
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The Bootstrap Technique and Private Inurement
In General
The bootstrap retention of ownership has meant that funds ex-
empted from taxation so that they might serve a public purpose have
been, in effect, diverted into the pockets of private individuals. "Private
inurement" is almost unique among the doctrines related to the boot-
strap problem in that most of the cases give practical effect to its claimed
principles. The Government has won many of the cases involving
private inurement, with the notable exception of the bootstrap cases
themselves. The courts have even, on occasion denied exemption where
private inurement was, at most, technical as in Powell Foundation 240
which denied exemption to a charity where the charity, to whom donor
had made a gift with a reservation of income, paid over to donor's wife
a sum very slightly in excess of the income derived from the burdened
assets. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell24 found private inure-
ment where patent fees were paid by small oil companies to a claimed
charitable feeder whose research activities benefited the major oil
companies; and Mabee Petroleum Corp. v. United States,242 treated an
excessive salary paid its donor by a claimed charitable foundation as
private inurement.243 Some findings of private inurement have been
under sections 101(7), 101(8) or 101(9) of the 1939 Code,244 but
those cases also require that the organization and the funds in question
must be predominantly devoted to charitable purposes. 245
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952), which emphasized liberal construction of a statute
granting tax exemption and approved the exemption, with the court of appeals decision
in the same case, which stressed strict construction and denied exemption.
24021 T.C. 279 (1953).
241 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950).
242203 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1953).
243 Accord, Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F.2d 552 (10th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 620 (1940). Contra, Home Oil Mill v. Willingham,
68 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945) (a destination case which found a salary of $15,000
a year to donor's sister, as chairman of the trust, not unreasonable).
2 44 Now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501(c) (4), (6), (7).
245 Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 620 (1940) (donor or his wife were to get $5,000 a year
for life out of income); Jockey Club v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1935)
(members, in effect, benefited from profits made from transactions with non-
members) ; Gemological Institute, 17 T.C. 1604 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d
205 (9th Cir. 1954) (founder and executive director received fifty per cent of net
income of allegedly exempt organization) ; Medical Diagnostic Ass'n, 42 B.T.A. 610
(1940) (allegedly nonprofit laboratory served commercial convenience of its members
and profited from nonmembers in a way not unlike Universal Oil Prods.). See also
Underwriters' Labs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 371 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 756 (1943) ; Fort Scott Clinic & Hosp. Corp. v. Brodrick, 99 F. Supp. 515
(D. Kan. 1951), whose charities also were set up primarily to convenience and benefit
their members.
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While either a parent or a feeder organization can be used for
private inurement, the feeder is particularly controllable by the seller
or donor, and with it a reputable exempt organization, such as a uni-
versity, can be used as the basic charity.24 There is often economic
inurement in fact, in the form of cheaper services and other commer-
cial conveniences, even though the inurement does not take the form of
actual cash dividends.
247
The pattern of private inurement is similar in all three types of
charitable bootstrap. Wherever the price exceeds fair market value,
the excess will be a diversion of funds from Charity to Owners. Even
where an unfair price can not be proved, these transactions still involve
substantial direct and indirect private inurement. The so-called "down
payment" usually is directly taken out of the earnings of the old
business and involves a dividend to the original owners-as was held
in Kolkey-while the retention of most aspects of ownership, including
both control and the risks of the business, makes the subsequent pay-
ments distributions of profits and income, not purchase price payments
from an independent source. In the cemetery bootstraps, in addition to
these usual bootstrap forms of private inurement, the exempt cemetery
itself may be the vehicle of a number of related commercial activities on
the part of Owners.
"Accumulation" of Income, and Private Inurement
A practical sign of the economic exploitation of an exemption is
that little or no income is being currently spent for exempt purposes.
248
In the bootstrap cases the income received must be devoted to notes or
other debt for a considerable term of years, and little or nothing is
distributed to charity. The exempt entity will accumulate an eventual
"equity" (unless the price turns out to be so inflated that the instru-
246 The fact that institutions which are supposedly pillars of respectability, such
as churches and universities, are not only willing, but eager to participate in such tax
avoidance devices raises some interesting questions about their, and our, morality.
Perhaps our rectitude myths parallel our wealth and power myths.
247 United States v. La Societe Francaise, 152 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 793 (1946) ; Northwest Municipal Ass'n v. United States, 99 F.2d
460 (8th Cir. 1938) (both stress that private inurement need not assume the form
of direct cash payments). See Duffy v. Birmingham, 190 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1951)
(charitable trust which paid employee pensions viewed as set up for private com-
mercial convenience of employer); Puritan Church, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 485
(1951), aff'd per curiam, 209 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 810
(1955) (created in part for personal purposes of founder); Davenport Foundation,
6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1335 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 170 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1948)
(good deal of income inured directly to donor; not all of balance went to exempt
purposes) ; Pasadena Methodist Foundation, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 905 (1943)
(private charity).
248 Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 128 (1954).
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ments are never paid off as in Kolkey) but this hardly serves any
immediate public goals. 49
If there is accumulation of income, it is hard to conclude that any
exempt purposes are being "fed." Thus, Bear Gulch Water Co. v.
Commissioner,25 held that where funds are accumulated for, but not
paid over to, a parent state university the funds do not "accrue" to the
parent-i.e., if you accumulate, you do not "feed." 251
Accumulation may provide a subtle form of private inurement
through the economic power which the control of a substantial charity
may represent-the power to purchase, to hire and fire, and to grant or
withhold large contributions, as well as to effect major business deals.252
These powers may be rationalized, at least, where an exempt organiza-
tion is in fact currently distributing funds to charity or otherwise serv-
ing public purposes. They appear to have less warrant if funds are
merely accumulating and no exempt purposes are presently being
served.2 53  But discussion of accumulation requires an examination of
the Revenue Act of 1950, which dealt specifically with "unreasonable
accumulation."
The Effect of the Revenue Act of 1950
Abuses of the charitable exemption, either of the bootstrap type
or in conjunction with sale and leasebacks, provided the main impetus
for the Revenue Act of 1950.254 The act dealt with the dilemma arising
from the earlier provisions which forced an organization performing
some business activities to be held totally exempt or not exempt at all.
It enacted sections taxing "unrelated business income" 255 and then
amended section 101 of the 1939 Code to provide that the tax on
249 But see Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.
1954), where the Seventh Circuit held, in effect, that it did not matter how much a
feeder accumulated, nor that nothing was being currently spent for charity. Accord,
Ohio Furnace Co., 25 T.C. 179 (1955) (gov't appeal withdrawn).
250 116 F.2d 975 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 652 (1941). See also cases
cited note 233 supra.
251 Andrew W. Mellon, 36 B.T.A. 977 (1937), acq., 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 20,
nonacq., 1938-1 Cum. BULL. 49, and William T. Bruckner, 20 B.T.A. 419 (1930),
acq., X-1 Cum. BuLL. 9 (1931), specifically approve of accumulation without current
distributions to exempt purposes. However, these are arguably distinguishable as
being "temporary accumulations" pending full operation of the charities created.
252 More than one commentator has pointed out the dominant influence of the
private foundation, which exercises decisive economic power without publicity or
regulation-and, indeed, is generally a political untouchable. Tunks, supra note 223;
Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 477 (1950).
253 See Note, 98 U. PA. L. RE~v. 696 (1950).
254 Ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906. See Note, 60 YA.LE L.J. 879 (1951); Comment, 60
YALE L.J. 851 (1951). And see Statement of Secretary of the Treasury Snyder,
Hearings on the General Revenue Revision of 1950 Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1950).
255 Now INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 511-14.
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"unrelated business income" would not result in the denial of exemp-
tion.256 "Unrelated business net income" was defined as gross income
from any trade or business whose conduct is not substantially related
to the organization's exempt activity. However, so-called "passive"
income--including dividends, interest, royalties, certain rental income
and capital gains-was excluded from unrelated business income. The
Senate Committee stated that this type of "passive" income is "not
likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having
similar income." 257 It is not clear why these types of "passive" income
involve activity on the part of an exempt organization that is any more
or less competitive with private enterprise than other types of business
income2 58
But the unrelated business income tax would have meant little if
charities could have continued to use feeders with the assistance of the
destination test. Section 301 (b) of the 1950 Revenue Act (the so-
called "feeder amendment") amended section 101 of the 1939 Code by
providing that no profit organization shall be exempt merely because
its profits are payable to an exempt organization.259 However, in this
case too the statute made exceptions for certain types of "rentals."
Finally, the act contained provisions designed to meet various
abuses that had been revealed 260 in dealings between donors and their
tax-exempt entities. Certain transactions between donors and founda-
tions created by them were prohibited 261 at the penalty of loss of ex-
emption,262 and loss of exemption was also prescribed if amounts
"accumulated" out of income by a section 101 (6) organization are not
256 Now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (b).
257 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1950).
258 One other loophole is added to these provisions by the exclusion of churches
from the unrelated business income tax. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 421, added by ch.
120, § 8, 57 Stat. 149 (1943), as amended (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 511). This
makes the lease technique unnecessary for those churches that choose to engage in
transactions such as the bootstrap deals. See Moore & Dohan, supra note 223.
2 5 9 Now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 502.
260 Hearings on H.R. 8920 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 81st Cong.,
?2d Sess. (1950) ; Hearings on the General Revenue Revision of 1950 Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
261 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3813, added by ch. 994, § 331, 64 Stat. 957 (1950)
(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 503). Generally these "prohibited transactions" are
between an exempt organization and its donor or other closely related persons and
involve loans, compensation, sales, etc., where the amounts involved are not reasonable
or security is inadequate, etc., or where the transaction otherwise results in diverting
a substantial part of the income or corpus to a creator of the organization or other
closely related person.
262 Representative of the administrative role in tax erosion is Rev. Rul. 59-29,
1959-1 Cum. BuLL. 123. There what was clearly a loan (a bank deposit) was held
not a loan for purposes of the "prohibited transaction" statute (§ 503 (c) (1)), thereby
eliminating some of the statutory protection, as well as giving the bank a deduction
for a "contribution" of funds whose possession and control it retained (it was trustee
of its employees' pension funds, which it deposited with itself). This is discussed in
Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, in 1959-1 TAx REsISoT COMPENDiUM 19.
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actually paid out by the end of the taxable year, if the accumulations
are unreasonable, and so on.
26 3
The House bill would have prevented many of the current abuses
of exempt entities. 64 It restricted exemption to income actually dis-
tributed to charity,26 providing that, with certain exceptions, a private
charitable trust was to be taxed on all income not paid to beneficiaries
within two and one-half months after the close of the taxable year.
But the Senate eliminated these provisions on the argument that they
might injure "charitable" projects,266 and the final law contained only
such limitations on the accumulation of income as that it be not "un-
reasonable in amount or duration." 267
It has been said that the addition of these qualifying phrases
"removed all the sting from the House provisions." 268 This was
prophetic. With the possible exception of Kolkey no court decision
has arrived at a holding of unreasonable accumulation.269
In the bootstrap cases, all of Feeder's income for a number of years
will go to Owner. It is by no means certain that Charity will ever
benefit from the accumulation, especially where the price is inflated. It
is difficult to see how there could be a more clear cut case of unreason-
able accumulation.2 70  It is true that the original bootstrap cases have
often involved tax years before the effective date of the legislation
expressly dealing with unreasonable accumulations. However, the
bootstrap accumulations involve both the failure currently to devote
exempt income to exempt purposes and the inurement of income to
Owner while Charity merely accumulates future rights. If the general
263 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3814, added by ch. 994, § 331, 64 Stat. 957 (1950)
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 504).
264 The Senate rejected the House provisions as "harsh," stating that there could
be no objection where the transactions were carried out at arm's length. S. REP. No.
2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). This approach is reminiscent of the judicial
language ("not sham," etc.) rejecting inquiry into dealings between related parties.
265 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41, 115-23 (1950).
266S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1950).
267 1nt Rev. Code of 1939, § 3814, added by ch. 994, § 331, 64 Stat. 957 (1950)
(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 504).
268 Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 873 (1951).
.269 Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1954);
Truscott v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19515 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Samuel
Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956) ; Knapp Bros.
Shoe Mfg. Corp. v. United States 142 F. Supp. 899 (Ct. Cl. 1956) ; Estate of Howes,
30 T.C. 909 (1958), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st
Cir. 1959); W. H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433 (1957), order amended, 17 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 110 (1958) ; Ohio Furnace Co., 25 T.C. 179 (1955) (gov't appeal withdrazwn).
270 Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 128, applies the "unreasonable accumu-
lation" doctrine to an original bootstrap situation. Unfortunately, the Internal Reve-
nue Service has never published an explanation of its position in the bootstrap cases.
This would not only have been helpful to the public and the tax bar, but might have
brought an improved understanding of Internal Revenue Service policy. And see
Rev. Rul. 54-137, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 289.
TAX EROSION AND THE BOOTSTRAP SALE
principle that tax exemption is granted because funds are being devoted
to public purposes is to be taken seriously, then the bootstrap accumula-
tions should not have been permissible even before the 1950 Act.2"
Lease-Type Bootstraps and the 1950 Legislation
The "feeder amendment," which denied exemption to charitable
feeders,272 excluded "the rental by an organization of its real property
(including personal property leased with the real property)." 273 And
the "Supplement U" lease provisions of former section 423 274 tax as
"unrelated business income," "rental" income from leases for a term
of more than five years, where the lessor incurred certain indebtedness
in acquiring or improving the property.
These provisions created an opening for the lease-type bootstrap:
Owner takes a going business and "sells" it to Feeder who "rents"
it for a term of less than five years to a subsidiary, New Company, for
a large percentage of the profits of the business. The lease-type case
thus represents an effort to "split off" the operation of the transferred
business from its income. 7 This will permit the claim of exemption
of the business income (from the unrelated business income tax) as
mere "rent." Since the legislative history of the Revenue Act of
1950,217 indicates that the term "rent" was used only for passive in-
vestment income, this effort to stretch the term over active business
income parallels the formalistic use of the "sale" concept.
In effect this arrangement is an anticipatory assignment of income
in reverse. That is, Feeder and Charity have assigned the tree (the
operating business) to New Company, while keeping most of the fruit
(the business income). But it is not realistic to call the lease a "sham,"
for the new operating company is performing real functions as a cor-
porate entity. In other words the lease serves to permit two corporate
entities, Feeder and New Company, formally to operate the business,
and initially to receive the profits. To characterize Feeder's rent re-
271 United States v. Community Servs., Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert.
dcnied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952), holds that the enactment of the 1950 legislation merely
clarified the prior law.
27 2 For a discussion of § 302(d) of the 1950 Act, which excepts certain organiza-
tions from the "feeder amendment," see notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
273Revenue Act of 1950, §301(b), 64 Stat. 953 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 502). (Emphasis added.)
274Added by ch. 994, § 301(a), 64 Stat. 950 (1950) (now INT. Rzv. CODE OF
1954, § 514).
275 Hence the term "split feeder."
276 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. RE. No. 2319, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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ceipts as "dividends" suggests that both New Company and Feeder will
be initially taxed on the operating income of the business, since no basis
appears for a "dividends received credit." This is perhaps harsh in view
of the relationship between Owner, Feeder and New Company with
respect to the profits of the business. But to treat the receipts as rent
would be to accept a transparent effort to split off a business' operations
from its income and thereby to shift business income into charitable
hands on an exempt basis, and thence back into private pockets.
A realistic solution is to see Feeder and New Company as being, in
substance, in the position of joint operators and taxable as such on
their respective shares of the business income, Feeder's portion being
"unrelated business income." 27 With Feeder and the new operating
company, together, seen as occupying the same position that Feeder
alone occupied in the original bootstraps, the distribution of income to
Owner is subject to the analysis applicable to those transactions. In
one respect, in fact, there is more retained control here than in the
original bootstrap cases inasmuch as Owner, in the lease-type situations,
often retains some direct stock ownership in the new operating entity
itself.
One recent case is quite similar to the lease-type bootstraps. In
Amon G. Carter Foundation v. United States,178 the donor conveyed
various oil and gas interests and related equipment to his exempt family
foundation. The foundation in turn conveyed them to a new operating
company which it had formed, retaining unusually high "overriding
royalties" (approximately eighty per cent). This left the operations
in the hands of the operating company while reserving almost all of
the operating income to the foundation in the guise of passive royalty
income. A proper analysis would appear to be similar to that sug-
gested for the lease-type bootstraps, namely that the foundation and the
operating company jointly retained the working interest in a relation-
ship analogous to that of joint venturers. Therefore, the foundation was
receiving active operating income from the operation of the oil and
277 The language of the Regulations supports this position. Treas. Reg. 118,
§39.422-1(b) (1953), and Treas. Reg. 1.512(b)-i (1958), state: "[Ilf a payment
termed 'rent' by the parties is in fact a return of profits by a person operating the
property for the benefit of the tax-exempt organization or is a share of the profits
retained by such organization as a partner or joint venturer, such payment is not
within the exception for rent." On the other hand, the Regulations offset this to
some extent by specifically providing in Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.422-1(b) (3) (ii) (1953),
and Treas. Reg. 1.512(b)-1 (c) (2) (1958), that the income from the operation of an
office building is "rent," although in most respects the commercial and business activity
involved is so extensive as to make it the type of "rent" described by the provisions
just quoted. It is understood that efforts within the Internal Revenue Service to
correct this situation have been unavailing.
278 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1f 9342 (N.D. Tex. 1958).
TAX EROSION AND THE BOOTSTRAP SALE
gas properties and should have been subject to the unrelated business
income tax.270
But the Justice Department brief, while analyzing the situation,
added a "sham" contention concluding: 2s0 "the Court [should] ignore
the existence of [the operating company] insofar as the tax problem is
concerned." The court seized on this in its decision and stated that the
Government had merely urged sham and the piercing of the operating
company's entity. The court held it was not sham and did not really
examine the substance of the transaction-as frequently happens where
sham is urged in a situation where substance-over-form analysis is
appropriate."'
Despite the fate of the Carter Foundation case-an oil and gas
case decided in oil and gas country-there is some possibility that the
Commissioner will prevail in the lease-type bootstraps. The use of the
"rental" technique for avoiding the unrelated business income tax is so
transparent a device that the courts might give some weight in this
context to the many basic tax principles which a bootstrap transaction
violates.
The Cemetery Bootstraps
The ordinary bootstrap problems are further complicated in the
cemetery cases by the liberal interpretation of the provisions exempting
certain cemeteries from taxation." 2 The courts have held it was suffi-
cient for exemption, that a cemetery meet any one of three independent
requirements: (1) owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of its
members, (2) not operated for profit, (3) chartered as a cemetery but
279 Fisher, Oil and Gas Transactions of Exempt Organizations, in SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION, 6TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION
339, 354 (1955), comments as to a "split-feeder" situation like Carter Foundation:
"The substance of the transaction would not then be an effective disposition of the
working interest, even though the subsidiary entity became subject to tax on the
income of the working interest."
280 Brief for the Government, Amon G. Carter Foundation v. United States,
58-1 U.S. Tax as. [ 9342 (N.D. Tex. 1958).
281 The Solicitor General declined to appeal the case, although the ability to
split off a Feeder's or a Charity's "operating" income from its "passive" income
and thereby avoid the unrelated business income tax would appear to be an issue of
importance. It is understood that the Solicitor General's refusal to appeal was based
on the difficulty of piercing the entity of the operating company-but it would be
possible to recognize that entity, and still find that the charity was receiving a share
of operating income, not mere passive rent.
282 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(5), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended (now INT.
Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (13)), lists as organizations exempt from taxation:
"Cemetery companies owned and operated exclusively for the benefit of their members
or which are not operated for profit; and any corporation chartered solely for burial
purposes as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its charter to engage in
any business not necessarily incident to that purpose, no part of the net earnings of
vhich inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
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not permitted by charter to engage in a business not incidental to burial
purposes, and with no private inurement.
28 3
To treat these three criteria as separate and independent opens an
easy route to abuse. It means that if one of the first two standards is
met, both private inurement and large scale business activity would be
permissible. Private inurement is so basic a barrier to exemption under
section 501 of the 1954 Code that it would hardly seem permissible here.
A nonprofit cemetery under section 501 (c) (13) surely has no greater
claim to exemption, and therefore no lesser need to keep its skirts clean,
than a section 501 (c) (3) organization. It is understood that the
Commissioner regards the absence of private inurement as a minimum
essential for any section 501 (c) (13) exemption.284 And the concept of
"private inurement" has broadened beyond the point it represented when
most of the cemetery cases were decided fifteen or twenty years ago.
On the other hand, the Commissioner may have slightly eroded his own
position by failing to repeal regulations which permit a cemetery to pay
dividends of up to eight per cent a year on preferred stock if the stock
is retired at par as soon as possible.28
Similar comments should apply to the large scale business activities
which so many nonprofit cemeteries conduct. If the "members" for
whose "benefit" the cemetery is exclusively operated are limited to
owners of lots or burial rights,280 (a limitation which seems consistent
with the purposes of the exemption) then these broad commercial ac-
tivities are hard to justify. But "members" may mean those who
effectively control and operate the cemetery business and its many
related commercial operations, as decisions such as those in the Forest
Lawn cases 287 imply. It is difficult to see why the business of operating
a mortuary in competition with other private business should be tax-
exempt.
283 West Laurel Hill Cemetery Co. v. Rothensies, 139 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 780 (1944); Forest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n, 45 B.T.A.
1091 (1941), nonacq., 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 25; The Kensico Cemetery, 35 B.T.A. 498
(1937), nonacq., 1937-1 Cum. BULL. 40, aft'd, 96 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1938); Forest
Lawn Memorial Park As'n, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 738 (1946). None of these are
"bootstrap" cases. No cemetery bootstrap has as yet appeared before a court,
although litigation is understood to be en route.
284 This is implied by Rev. Rul. 58-190, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 15, at 17, which in
discussing nonprofit cemetery problems states: "an organization is not exempt from
tax merely because it is organized and operated not for profit."
2 85 Treas. Reg. 1.501 (c) (13)-1 (1958).
286West Laurel Hill Cemetery Co. v. Rothensies, 139 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 780 (1944).
287 Forest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n, 45 B.T.A. 1091 (1941), nonacq., 1942-2
Cum. BULL. 25; Forest Lawn Memorial Park Ass'n, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 738
(1946).
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Furthermore, section 170(c) (5), which was added by the 1954
Code to permit the deduction of "contributions" to nonprofit ceme-
teries288 contains a more broadly stated ban on private inurement
2 9
than does section 501(c) (13), which is a verbatim reenactment of a
statute which had been in force for many years. 90 It is unlikely that
Congress in simultaneously enacting both statutes in 1954 meant the
greater privilege of exemption to embody the lesser restriction on private
inurement. It is also possible that the increased tax advantages brought
by section 170 (c) (5) may lead to a closer judicial scrutiny of nonprofit
cemeteries than has been practiced to this point.
One might argue that the Forest Lawn cases reveal an economic
complex in which the manager of the cemetery benefited by its dealings
with other companies which he, or persons closely related to him,
controlled. It has been suggested that the criterion for private inure-
ment be whether it is possible for the earnings to be distributed to any
private individual or corporation.29' This test might prevent direct
private inurement if "earnings" were adequately defined, but does not
cope with the indirect inurement that is so important a part of arrange-
ments such as those in Forest Lawn.
The cemetery decisions reveal some of the same judicial formalism
and reluctance to examine dealings between closely related parties that
is characteristic of the bootstrap area. Thus in Kensico Cemetery, the
vendors of land to the cemetery were to receive half the proceeds from
any future sales of cemetery lots. The court approved this arrange-
ment, emphasizing that the vendors did not get a share of the "net
earnings" of the cemetery company, but only a portion of the "gross."
A verbalism of this sort cannot obscure the fact that the sale of lots
was a major business operation for the cemetery company. Under this
arrangement the original owners would continue to share indefinitely in
288 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c) (5), provides that a "charitable contribution"
is a contribution or gift to or for the use of: "A cemetery company owned and
operated exclusively for the benefit of its members, or any corporation chartered
solely for burial purposes as a cemetery corporation and not permitted by its charter
to engage in any business not necessarily incident to that purpose, if such company
or corporation is not operated for profit and no part of the net earnings of such com-
pany or corporation inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."
289 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 210 (1954), states flatly: "A corporation
will not qualify under this paragraph if any part of its net earnings inure to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or if it is operated for profit." This
amounts to saying that compliance with only one of the three criteria is insufficient.
290 Section 231(5) of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 253, had the
same wording as Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(5), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 33, as amended
(now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §501(c) (13)).
291 West Laurel Hill Cemetery Co. v. Rothensies, 139 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 780 (1944), distinguished Kensico and the Forest Lawn cases
on the argument that in the former the earnings could not be distributed to any
individual or corporation.
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income from the sale of lots. The Commissioner does not accept
Kensico as a resolution of the problem. 92
Kensico, furthermore, was based on a New York statute that
permitted land to be sold to a cemetery corporation in return for up to
half of the gross receipts from the sale of cemetery lots. 293  Due to
extensive profiteering and other abuses, this authority was revised in
1949 so as to forbid cemetery corporations to pay more than the fair
and reasonable market value of land purchased, with the terms,
method of payment and price to be subject to court approval. 94 This
eliminates the most important justification for Kensico-the existence
of a state statute approving the type of open-end arrangement involved
(which again illustrates the undesirability of basing federal tax law on
state laws).295 Finally, although there was complete retention of risk
in Kensico, it lacked the additional element of retention of control true
of the cemetery bootstraps.
The public purposes for which cemeteries get tax exemption may
be less lofty, or less articulate, than those necessary for a section
501 (c) (3) exemption. But this can be offset by the fact that com-
mercialism, retention of risk and control, and private inurement appear
to be more overt in the cemetery bootstrap cases. In at least one case
it is understood that the cemetery and the related profit enterprises of
the Old Owners advertised jointly and even employed common sales-
men.
29 6
VII. THE CAPITAL GAINS PROBLEM AND THE BOOTSTRAP CASES
The central bootstrap issue is the tax characterization of the
transfer of the business. If the transfer falls within the traditional
"sale" category, that determines not only the capital gains issue, but
292 There is an outstanding nonacquiescence in the Kensico case, 1937-1 Cum.
BULL. 40.
293 N.Y. MEMBERSHIP CoRP. LAws § 87;
294 Ibid. See Walsh & Walsh, The 1949 Revision of the Membership Corporation
Law in Regard to Cemetery Corporations, 24 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 168, 174 (1949).
295 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
296 The handling of these cemetery problems may have suffered from the fact
that they represent a secluded corner of the tax law which to date has been given
inadequate public attention. This may be a product of a cultural proclivity to shy
away from death and any of its trappings. Revenue agents and others are often
reluctant to inquire too closely into the details of cemetery operation, mortuaries,
burial and death. See Walsh & Walsh, supra note 294, for a description of some of
the objectionable practices indulged in by those engaged in the business end of cemetery
operations. In any event, despite the religious overtones of death and burial, there is
a serious question whether cemetery operations truly serve such public purposes as
to warrant their existing tax treatment. To permit contributions to a cemetery to
be deductible often is to subsidize personal expenditures. The contributor is paying
for the preservation or beautification of his own last resting place. Since a full
consideration is paid for burial in such cemeteries, the public service is questionable.
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such basic exemption issues as private inurement. A bootstrap transfer
(or any transfer) must be analyzed as a complex of economic relation-
ships through time, rather than as characterized by the legal label. So
viewed, bootstrap owners appear to be receiving a steady flow of
business profits, as entrepreneurs rather than as creditors. The
contrary conclusions reached in the bootstrap cases must be explained
in part by the character of the capital gains doctrine.
The Claimed Rationales of Capital Gains Taxation
The tax treatment of capital gains raises questions not merely
as to the relationship between its principles and their application in
practice, but as to the consistency of those principles with general prin-
ciples of progressive income taxation.197  The statutes29s talk of the
"sale and exchange" of a "capital asset," or of "property used in the
trade or business," as producing "capital gain." None of the first three
terms appears to have any reference to economic reality,' 9 nor does the
29 7 See SELTZER, THE NATURE: AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND
LOSSES (1951); TAX INSTITUTE, CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION (1946); U.S. TREASURY
DE'T, TAX ADVISORY STAFF, FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS
AND LOSSES (1951); VIcREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSvE TAXATION ch. 5 (1947);
Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957);
Groves, Taxation of Capital Gains, 1959-2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1193. None
of these analyses find any very adequate justification for capital gains treatment.
But see Clark, The Paradox of Capital Gains: Taxable Income That Ought Not
To Be Currently Taxed, 1959-2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1243; Miller, Taxation
of Capital Gains, 1959-2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1257; Smith, Tax Treat-
ment of Capital Gains, 1959-2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1233; and see also Steger,
Economic Consequences of Substantial Changes in the Method of Taxing Capital
Gains and Losses, 1959-2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1261.
298 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 50, as amended, § 117(j), added
by ch. 619, § 151, 56 Stat. 846 (1942), as amended (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 1221, 1222, 1231).
299 See Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gain Tax-
ation, 59 YALE LJ. 837, 1057 (1950). If the essential meaning of "capital asset"
lies in the distinction between income and the asset that produced it (Staff Comm.
of the Joint Economic Committee, The Federal Revenue System: Fact and Problems
62 (1959)), i.e., in the difference between the fruit and the tree, then how does one
explain the capital gains treatment accorded income both from the cutting or disposal
of timber and from coal royalties, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 631, 1231, from un-
harvested crops sold with land, § 1231 (the very "fruit" itself), or the sale of live-
stock "held for draft, breeding or dairy purposes," § 1231? Some of the items in
§ 1231 fall within the technical rubric of "property used in the trade or business,"
which for present purposes is primarily another label for "capital asset." The simi-
larity of these items to the normal day-by-day profits of a business casts doubt on
the supposed line between investments and business for capital gains purposes. Nor
can the distinction be whether the receipt is due to "personal services or efforts,"
Miller, Capital Gains of the Fruits of Personal Efforts: Before and Under the 1954
Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1 (1954), in view of the capital gains treatment provided for
stock options, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421, and the proceeds from distributions
from employees' (pension) trusts, § 402. The court decisions appear to grant even
more tax relief in this area of stock options to those who do not qualify for the
statutory relief, than to those who do, MacDonald v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534
(7th Cir. 1956); McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954); Com-
missioner v. Stone's Estate, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954). How explain, moreover,
that while the sale or exchange of patents receives capital gain treatment, § 1235,
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very term "capital gains" reflect any independently meaningful concept
in either economics or accounting.300 The classic economic definition
of "income" is in terms of "money value of the net accretion of one's
economic power between two points in time," 301 meaning one's con-
sumption plus the increase in one's net worth over any period of time.
But there is nothing in this approach that permits a distinction between
''capital gain" and "income."
The lack of any real distinction 302 lies at the heart of the problem.
No fully articulate rationalization for capital gains treatment has been
set out by Congress. Vague legislative comments were made about
the original capital gains provisions:
"The sale of farms, mineral properties and other capital assets is
now seriously retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned
over a series of years are, under the present law, taxed as a lump
sum in the year in which the profit is realized." 03
This justification for special treatment would appear to rest on two
grounds: (1) gains accumulated over a period of years "bunch up"
in the year realized, and so are taxed at higher rates under a progres-
sive system; (2) the development of the economy requires the "in-
centive" provided for "investment"-type transfers by the low capital
gains rate.
The "Bunching" Rationale
It has been suggested that the bunching argument is the "one
really meritorious argument in favor of special tax treatment for cap-
the transfer of copyrights is taxed as ordinary income, § 1231 ? Little assurance is
provided by the vagueness of some of the statutory language. In the Code's § 1221,
defining "capital asset," the phrase appears "property held by the taxpayer." (Em-
phasis added.) No term defined by so ambiguous a concept as "property" could be
very clearcut.
See discussion at note 20 supra as to the application of the "property" concept to
the stock option problem. The sale of an oil payment or royalty is traditionally given
capital gains treatment as the sale of "property" and a fractional share of a capital
asset. The Federal Revenue System, supra at 51. But by economic interest doctrine
an oil payment or royalty represents ordinary income from a retained ownership
share in the business of extracting natural resources. And the Supreme Court recently
held in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), that the sale of a"carved-out" oil payment results in ordinary income. The "property" and "capital
asset" concepts have thus produced capital gains treatment for what, in principle, is an
anticipation of future income.
300 See note 299 rupra. SELTZER, op. cit. supra note 297; Blum, supra note 297;
Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 1959-2 TAx REvisioN CoM-
rENDIUM 1203.
301 HAIG, THE FEDERAL INcOME TAx 7 (1921); SIMONS, PERSONAL IXCOME
TAXATION 51, 125 (1938).
302 Miller, supra note 299, 59 YALE L.J. at 1078; Surrey, supra note 300.
303 H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).
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ital gains." 304 Meritorious or not, it does not seem to justify capital
gains taxation. The capital gains holding period is now only six
months; 305 for patents the holding period is zero.3"' Since a great
many capital gains transactions are opened and closed within less than
the annual accounting period, such transactions are hardly being
protected from bunching. °7
Furthermore, most of those who benefit by capital gains treatment
are high bracket taxpayers,3 0 8 for whom averaging is often of little
importance.3 9 It is the capital gains schedule which sharply cuts their
effective rate of taxation.310 And if it is desirable to grant relief from
bunching, any type of income, not just investment types, would seem
to qualify. Finally, the twenty-five per cent capital gains rate has little
factual relationship to the rate that would have applied had the gain
been taxed as it accrued, instead of being bunched.3 11
The lower courts often cite but give little practical effect to the
anti-bunching rationale, as the patent and bootstrap cases illustrate. In
Carl G. Dreymann,1 2 the Commissioner argued with no success, that
capital gains treatment was not appropriate for recurrent installment
receipts. The Government did not appeal although the Supreme Court,
at least, takes the bunching rationale seriously by denying capital gains
treatment where income is received over a period of time. 13
304 Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the Federal In-
come Tax, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 440, 442 (1948).305 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(h), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 52, as amended (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1223).3
06 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235.
307The Treasury Department in 1951 urged that the holding period should be
made a year in order to provide greater consistency with the bunching rationale.
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, op. cit. supra note 297.
308 GRoVEs, POSTvAR TAXATION AND EcoNoMIC PROGRESS 214 (1946); PAUL,
TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY (1947) ; Hearings on Proposed Tax Revisions Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1938) ; The Federal
Revenue System, supra note 299. U.S. TREAsuRY DEP'T, STATISTICS OF INCOME
(1956), contains statistics which reveal that out of 45.5 million returns showing
income below $20,000, 2.15 million or 4.7% reported tax savings from capital gains
totaling $504 million, an average of about $250 a return, while out of 700,000
returns with income over $20,000 more than 300,000 returns, or 45.7% reported
savings on capital gains totaling over $2 billion, an average of about $6,500 a return,
and several times the total for the rest of the country.
309 The Federal Revenue System, supra note 299, at 65.
310 Heller, Investor's Decisions, Equity and the Capital Gains Tax, 1955 Com-
PENDIUm 381, 390.311 The Federal Revenue System, stpra note 299, at 61.
312 11 T.C. 153 (1948).
313 Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955); Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1930). In Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S.
260, 265 (1958), the Court stated that § 117, whose "purpose was 'to relieve the
taxpayer from .. . excessive tax burdens on the gains resulting from a conversion
of capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such
conversions' . . . has always been narrowly construed so as to protect the revenue
against artful devices. . . ." When the Court commented that the capital gains
"exception" had "always" been narrowly construed, it must have meant only by itself.
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The "Incentives" Rationale
The other major justification offered for capital gains treatment
is that it provides the necessary incentives 314 for business investment.
315
This argument is offered in support of many of the tax "loopholes"
considered here. It assumes that business incentive is the only mechan-
ism for producing a healthy and growing economy. But, depending
on the state of economy, there may be other modes of public and private
spending that produce more socially desirable forms of capital accu-
mulation and a healthier and more broadly based economic structure.310
In selecting among these alternative philosophies a primary em-
phasis on business "investment" appears to include a preference for a
distribution of the tax burden that leaves more in the hands of the high
bracket taxpayer.3 17  Such special treatment of capital gains is one of
the most important factors in the erosion of our democratic system of
progressive taxation. It is a classic example of the type of rationaliza-
tion of special interests that the formalism so frequently encountered
in this study serves to mask.
VIII. SOME INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
For purposes of this Article, the component elements of the boot-
strap problem have been separated and individually analyzed. But the
proper analysis of a bootstrap does not turn upon any single factor such
as retention of risk, use of an exemption or loss carryover, retention of
control or deviation from the proclaimed patterns for capital gains
treatment. Indeed, many of the individual elements are relatively
innocuous: people often dispose of businesses, sometimes get an in-
flated price, often have a charitable purchaser, frequently have the
314 SELTZER, op. cit. supra note 297; Blum, supra note 297; Brown, The Locked-In
Problem, 1955 COMPENDIUM 367. This is the standard argument of almost every tax
lobbyist.
315A minor objection is that the only statutory criterion for distinguishing "in-
vestment" from "speculation" is the six-months holding period-surely an inadequate
dividing line. Furthermore, an "incentive" that gives a greater tax stimulus to casual
stock market speculation than to regular business activity is open to question. See
Heller, .supra note 310, at 290-91.
316 See Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform, in 1959-1 TAx RmsioN Com-
PENDIUM 19. The question as to whether fiscal policy should take the form of an
emphasis on business investment or on other forms of public or private spending is
beyond the scope of this paper. In politics we quickly see the disadvantages to
democracy of stimulating the power of a few at the top. But the parallel in fiscal
policy of stimulating investment with a set of special tax privileges is not so readily
dissected. It is suggested that a more democratically oriented economy will afford
a sounder base for economic growth and prosperity than any system of special
incentives. And see, Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, 11 TAX L.
REv. 203, 219 (1956) ; Ruttenberg, The Declining Role of Business Investment in a
Growing Economy, 1955 COMPENDIUm 217.
317 See Heller, supra note 310, at 381.
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present management continue for a period. Notes with little capital
behind them are given and received; percentage leases are often utilized;
loss corporations are frequently involved in the transfer of a business.
The issue is the combined impact of all these elements, in terms of the
policies of income taxation proclaimed by Congress and the Supreme
Court.
The bootstrap transactions have been upheld by the courts despite
the violation of a combination of at least four claimed public policies:
the policy against granting tax exemption for activities and funds a
significant portion of which serves private benefit rather than public
purposes, the policy against permitting tax exemption for the opera-
tion of competitive businesses, the policy that capital gains treatment
is to be given to significant economic transfers of investment-type
assets but not to ordinary commercial or business income, and the policy
that transactions are to be judged on their entire substance rather than
their naked form. Not only do the original bootstrap decisions them-
selves disregard or bypass these basic principles but when the prin-
ciples are analyzed in operation it is seen that other decisions, par-
ticularly in the lower courts, often give them no more than lip service.
This situation has many disconcerting implications if one believes in
the importance of a democratic system of progressive income taxation.
Possible explanations of these phenomena were noted during the
course of their analysis-particularly the role of judicial formalism,
and of certain institutional practices of the taxing process. Part II of
this paper will be devoted to a detailed analysis of the final major type
of bootstrap transfer, the unlitigated problem of the "loss bootstrap,"
and to general conclusions regarding the process of tax erosion as
exemplified by the bootstrap transactions.
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